Foundations for Collective Decision-Making over Complex Decision Spaces

Many societal decisions on which we want collective input — from allocating a public budget to deciding how an automated decision rule should behave — have enormous combinatorial spaces of possible outcomes. The standard approach to eliciting public input in such contexts is to elicit element-level judgments (e.g., which decision rule output a person prefers at a single input) and assume they suffice to reconstruct what people want. In this talk, I will present recent work (Flanigan & Si, EC 2026) showing that such elicitation methods fundamentally cannot identify preference structures that deal with global properties of the outcome, such as ensuring that a budget be balanced over impact categories, or that a decision rule treats like people alike. The preference model underlying this result, which generalizes standard choice models to represent priorities over the entire outcome space, also suggests a way forward: eliciting preferences at the level of global priorities rather than local judgements may recover richer preferences efficiently. I will illustrate this with ongoing work on participatory budgeting and discuss the questions it raises for the foundations of preference elicitation over complex decision spaces.

Date

Speakers

Bailey Flanigan

Affiliation

Massachusetts Institute of Technology