



The Multatuli Lecture 1999

International Society: What is the Best We Can Do?

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I finished the first draft of this lecture just before the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia began — a campaign that provides, I think, a prime example of the failure of international society. A double failure in this case: its political agencies were not able to respond in a timely fashion to the disaster of the former Yugoslavia, and then they were not able to find a more effective form of military intervention. The problem both times wasn't one of organization but of political will, and I am afraid that I won't have much to say in this lecture about how to solve it. No doubt there are organizational structures that lend themselves to swift and strong action in a crisis. But these structures can as easily produce reckless and cruel acts as wise ones, and so we need to limit their powers. And then, properly limited, they may not act at all. This dilemma is an old one, and my way of dealing with it — which, as you will see, is to multiply structures and agents in the hope that somewhere, somehow, someone will do the right thing — will certainly seem inadequate. I concede immediately that I cannot produce an organizational chart showing how a decision to act rightly in international society would be deliberated, and decided, and then resolutely carried out. There is no such procedural or organizational solution; we have to think instead of a political strategy for coping with crises and for creating the sorts of agents that might cope successfully. That's my goal. It doesn't answer to the urgency of the daily news, but these days nothing could answer.

I

Imagine the possible political arrangements of international society as if they were laid out along a continuum marked off according to the degree of centralization. Obviously, there are alternative

markings: the recognition and enforcement of human rights could also be measured along a continuum, as could democratization, economic laissez-faire, welfare provision, pluralism, and so on. But I think that focusing on centralization is the best way of opening a discussion of international politics and the quickest way to reach all the other political and moral questions, above all the classical question: what is the best or the best possible regime? What constitutional goals should we set ourselves in an age of globalization?

My plan is to present seven possible regimes or constitutions or political arrangements. I will do this discursively, without providing a list in advance, but I do want to list the criteria against which the seven arrangements have to be evaluated: these are their capacity to promote peace, distributive justice, cultural pluralism, and individual freedom. Obviously, within the scope of a single lecture, I will have to deal much too briefly and summarily with some of the arrangements and some of the criteria. This is especially regrettable since the criteria turn out to be inconsistent with, or at least in tension with, one another. So my argument will be complicated, and could be, probably should be, much more so.

II

It will be best to begin with the two ends of the continuum. On one side, let's say the left side (though I will raise some doubts about that designation later on), there is a unified global state, something like Kant's 'world republic', with a single undifferentiated set of citizens, identical with the set of adult human beings, all of them possessed of the same rights and obligations. This is the form that maximum centralization would take: each individual, every person in the world, would be



connected directly to the centre. A global empire, in which one nation ruled over all the others, would also operate from a single centre, but insofar as its rulers differentiated between the dominant nation and all the others, their rule would necessarily be mediated, and this would represent a qualification on its centralized character. Following Hobbes's argument in *Leviathan*, I want to say that the global state could be a monarchy, oligarchy, or democracy: the degree of centralization is not affected by the political character of the centre. By contrast, centralization is certainly affected by any racial, religious, or ethnic divisions, whether these are hierarchical in nature, as in the imperial case, establishing significant inequalities among the groups, or merely functional or regional. Division of any sort moves us rightwards on the continuum as I am imagining it.

At the far right is the regime or the absence-of-regime that political theorists call 'international anarchy.' This phrase describes what is in fact a highly organized world, but one that is radically decentred. The organizations are individual sovereign states, and there is no effective law that is binding on all of them. There is no global authority or procedure for policy determination, and there is no encompassing legal jurisdiction. More than this (since I mean to describe an extreme condition), there are no groups of states that have accepted a common law and submitted to its enforcement by international agencies; there are no stable organizations of states working to generate common policies with regard, say, to environmental questions or arms control or financial speculation or any other issues of general concern. Sovereign states negotiate with each other on the basis of their 'national interests', reach agreements, and sign treaties, but the treaties are not enforceable by any third party. The leaders of these states watch each other nervously, and respond to each other's policies, but in every other sense, the centres of political decision-making are fully independent: every state acts alone.

I don't mean this as an account of our own situation. I am not describing the world as it is in 1999. But we are obviously closer to the right than to the left side of the continuum.

The strategy of this lecture will be to move in from the two sides. I will be moving toward the centre, but from opposite directions, so as to suggest that I don't mean to describe a developmental or purposive history. The different regimes or arrangements are ideal types, not historical exemplars. And I don't assume in advance that the best regime lies at the centre, only that it doesn't lie at the extremes. Even that presumption needs to be justified. It isn't obvious, so I had better turn immediately to the twin questions: What's wrong with radical centralization? What's wrong with anarchy? The second of these is the easiest, since it is closer to our own experience. Anarchy leads regularly to war — and war to conquest; conquest to empire; empire to oppression; oppression to rebellion, civil war, and secession; and secession leads back to anarchy and war again. The viciousness of the circle is continually reinforced by the inequalities of wealth and power among the involved states, and by the shifting character of these inequalities (which depend on trade patterns, technological development, military alliances, and so on). All this makes for insecurity and fear not only among the rulers of the states but also among their ordinary inhabitants, and insecurity and fear are, as Hobbes has taught us, the chief cause of war.

But would an international society, however anarchic, all of whose constituent states were republics, be drawn into the same circle? Kant argued that republican citizens would be far less willing to accept the risks of war than kings were to impose those risks on their subjects — and so would be less threatening to their neighbors (*Perpetual Peace*, First Definitive Article). We certainly see evidence of that unwillingness in contemporary democracies, though it has not always been as strong as it is today.



At the same time, it is qualified today by the willing use of the most advanced military technologies — which don't, indeed, put their users at risk but impose very high costs on their targets. So it may be the case, as the Kosovo war suggests, that modern democracies won't live up to Kant's pacific expectations: they will fight, only not on the ground.

A rather different argument has been made by some contemporary political scientists: that, at least in modern times, democratic republics don't fight *with one another*. But if this is so (and here too the Kosovo war seems to be a counterexample), it is in part because they have had common enemies, and have established multilateral forms of cooperation and coordination, alliances for mutual security, that mitigate the anarchy of their relations. They have moved, so to speak, to the left along the continuum.

But I don't want to dismiss international anarchy without saying something about its advantages. Despite the hazards of inequality and war, sovereign statehood is a way of protecting distinct historical cultures, sometimes national, sometimes ethnic/religious in character. The passion with which stateless nations pursue statehood, the driven character of national liberation movements, reflect the somber realities of twentieth century international politics, from which it is necessary to draw moral and political conclusions. Sovereign power is a means of self-protection, and it is very dangerous to be deprived of this means. So, the *morally* maximal form of decentralization would be a society in which every national or ethnic/religious group that needed protection actually possessed sovereign power. But for reasons we all know, which have to do with the necessary territorial extension of sovereignty, the mixing of populations on the ground, and the uneven distribution of natural resources above and below the ground, dividing up the world in this way would be (has been) a bloody business, and once the wars start, the divisions that result are unlikely to be either just or stable.

The problems at the other end of the continuum are of a different kind. Warfare as we know it would be impossible in a radically centralized global regime, for none of the motives for going to war would any longer operate: ethnic and religious differences and divergent national interests, indeed, every kind of sectional interest, would simply cease to exist. Diversity would be radically privatized. In principle, at least, the global state would be constituted solely and entirely by autonomous individuals, free, within the limits of the criminal law, to choose their own life plans.

In practice, however, this constituting principle is unlikely to prevail. Ideal types should not be fictional types. They must fit an imaginable reality. It just isn't plausible that the citizens of a global state would be, except for the free choices they make, exactly like one another, all the collective and inherited differences that we now live with having disappeared in the course of the state's formation. Consider only the question of culture: surely disagreements about or, at least, diverse understandings of, how we ought to live, would persist, and these would continue to be embodied in actual ways of life, historical cultures and religions, commanding strong loyalties and seeking public expression. So let me redescribe the global state. Groups of many different sorts would continue to exist and shape the lives of their members in significant ways, but their existence would be ignored by the central authorities; particularist interests would be overridden; the public expression of cultural divergence would be repressed.

The reason for the repression is easily explained: the global state would be much like states today, only on a vastly greater scale. If it were to sustain itself over time, it too would have to command the loyalty of its citizens and give expression to a political culture distinctly its own. Given this necessity, I do not see how it could accomodate anything like the range of cultural and religious difference that we see in the world today.



Even a global state committed to toleration would be limited in its powers of accommodation by its commitment to what I will call 'globalism', that is, centralized rule over the whole world. For some cultures and religions can only survive if they are permitted degrees of separation that are incompatible with globalism. And so the survival of these groups would be at risk; they would not be able under the rules of the global state to sustain their way of life across the generations. This is the meaning I would give to Kant's warning that a cosmopolitan constitution could lead to 'terrifying despotism' (*Theory and Practice*, Part III) — the danger is less to individuals, it seems to me, than to groups. A more genuine regime of global toleration would have to make room for cultural and religious autonomy, but that would involve a move rightwards on the continuum.

Once again, however, I want to acknowledge the advantages that lie on the continuum's far left side, though in this case they are more hypothetical than actual, since we have much less experience of centralization than of anarchy. But we can generalize from the history of centralized states and suggest that global distributive justice might be better served by a strong government that was able to mobilize resources from, and apportion them among, all the countries and regions of the world. Of course, the will to undertake egalitarian reforms might well be absent in the world republic — just as it is in most sovereign states today. But at least the capacity would exist, the power to constrain market forces. The European Community provides some modest but not insignificant examples of the redistributions that centralized power makes possible. At the same time, however, the very strength of the centre means that none of the countries and regions could win any significant independence from it, even if they sought independence not in order to maintain inequalities from which they benefit but rather to preserve their cultural traditions. Once again, centralization carries with it the threat of tyranny.

III

Now let's move one step in from the left side of the continuum (I acknowledge in advance that my various 'steps' are not, so to speak, all of the same length: determining the precise location of different political arrangements is a rough and ready business). One step in brings us to a global regime that has the form of a *pax Romana*. It is centralized through the hegemony of a single great power over all the lesser powers of international society. This hegemony sustains world peace, even if there are intermittent rebellions, and it does this while still permitting some degree of cultural independence — perhaps in a form like that of the Ottoman *millet* system, under which different religious communities were granted (partial) legal autonomy. The autonomy is not secure, since the centre is always capable of cancelling it, nor will it necessarily take the form most desired by a particular group. It isn't negotiated between equals but granted by the powerful to the weak. Nonetheless, arrangements of this sort, as I have argued elsewhere, represent the most stable regime of toleration known in world history. The rulers of the empire recognize the value (at least, the prudential value) of group autonomy, and this recognition has worked very effectively for group survival. But the rulers obviously don't recognize individual citizens as participants in the government of the empire, they don't protect individual rights, and they don't aim at an equitable distribution of resources among either groups or individuals. Imperial hegemony is a form of political inequality that commonly makes for further inequalities in the economy and in social life generally.

I have to be careful in writing about imperial rule, since I am a citizen of the only state in the world today capable of aspiring to it. That's not my own aspiration for my country (nor do I really think that it's possible), but I won't pretend to believe that a *pax Americana*, however undesirable, is the worst thing that could happen to the world today, and I have been an advocate of a more activist American



political/military role in places like Rwanda and Kosovo. But a role of that sort is still far from imperial hegemony, which, though we might value it for the peace it brought (or even just for an end to the massacres), is clearly not one of the preferred regimes. It might reduce some of the risks of a global state, but not in a stable way, since imperial power is often arbitrary and capricious. And even if the empire protects group autonomy (which it doesn't always do), it can be very dangerous to individuals.

Now let's move in from the right side of the continuum: one step from anarchy brings us, I think, to something like the current arrangement of international society (hence this is the least idealized of my ideal types). We see in the world today a series of global organizations of a political, economic, and judicial sort — the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Court, and so on — that serve to modify state sovereignty. No state possesses the kind of absolute sovereignty described by early modern political theorists like Bodin or Hobbes, the kind that makes for anarchy in its strongest sense. On the other hand, the global organizations are weak; their decision mechanisms are uncertain and slow; their powers of enforcement are difficult to bring to bear and, at best, only partially effective. Warfare between or among states has been reduced, but overall violence has not been reduced. There are many weak states in the world today, and the global regime has not been successful in preventing civil wars, military interventions, savage repression of political enemies, massacres and 'ethnic cleansing' aimed at minority populations. Nor has global inequality been reduced, even though the flow of capital across borders (labour mobility too, I think) is easier than it has ever been — and, according to theorists of the free market, this ought to have egalitarian effects. All in all, we cannot be happy with the current state of the world. Indeed, the combination of (many) weak states with weak global organizations brings disadvantages from, so to speak, both directions: the protection of cultural difference is inadequate and so is the protection of

individual rights and the promotion of equality.

Let's take another step in from this same side, toward greater centralization. I don't think that this brings us to, say, a United Nations with its own army and police force or a World Bank with a single currency. In terms of intellectual strategy, we would probably do better to reach arrangements of that kind from the other side. Consider instead the same 'constitutional' arrangements that we currently have, reinforced now by a much stronger international civil society. Contemporary political theorists have argued that civil society, not only in theory but in practice too, can serve to strengthen the democratic state. Certainly, associations that engage, train, and empower ordinary men and women serve democracy more effectively than they serve other regimes, but, in fact, they probably strengthen any state that encourages rather than suppresses associational life. Would they also strengthen the semi-governmental international organizations that now exist? I am inclined to think that they already do this in modest ways and could do so much more extensively.

Imagine a wide range of civic associations — for mutual aid, human rights advocacy, the protection of minorities, the achievement of gender equality, the defence of the environment, the advancement of labour, and so on — organized on a much larger scale than at present. All these groups would have centres that weren't connected to the centres of particular states; all of them would operate across state borders; all of them would recruit activists and supporters without reference to nationality. And all of them would be engaged in activities of the sort that governments also ought to be engaged in — and where governmental engagement is more effective when it is seconded (sometimes, in fact, it is initiated) by citizen-volunteers. Once the volunteers were numerous enough, they would bring pressure to bear on particular states to cooperate with each other and with UN agencies, and the work they did themselves would enhance the effectiveness of the cooperation.

But it is a feature of the associations of civil society that they run after problems; they react to



crises; their ability to anticipate, to plan, and to prevent lags far behind that of the state. Their activists are more likely to minister heroically to the victims of a plague than to enforce public health measures in advance. They arrive in the battle zone only in time to assist the wounded and shelter the refugees. They protest environmental disasters that are already disastrous. Even when they predict coming troubles, they have too little power to act effectively. They are not responsible agents, and their warnings are often disregarded precisely because they are seen as irresponsible. As for the underlying, long-term problems of international society — insecurity and inequality above all — civil associations are at best mitigating factors: their activists can do many good things, but they can't make peace in a country torn by civil war or redistribute resources on a significant scale.

IV

I want now to take another step in from the left side of the continuum, but before doing that it would probably be useful to summarize the steps so far. Since this next one, and the one after that, will bring us to what seem to me the most attractive possibilities, I need to characterize, perhaps try to name, the less attractive ones canvassed so far. Note first that the right side of the continuum is a realm of pluralism and the left side a realm of unity. I am not happy with that description of right and left: there have always been pluralist tendencies on the left, and those are the tendencies that I identify with. Still, it is probably true that unity has been the dominant ambition of leftist parties and movements, so it doesn't make much sense, on this occasion anyway, to fiddle with the rightness and leftness of the continuum. Starting from the right, then, I have marked off three arrangements, moving in the direction of greater centralization but doing this, paradoxically, by adding to the pluralism of agents.

First, there is the anarchy of states, where there are no effective agents except the governments that act in the name of state sovereignty. Next, we add to these states a plurality of international political and financial organizations, with a kind of authority that limits but doesn't abolish sovereignty. And after that, we add a plurality of international associations that operate across borders and serve to strengthen the constraints on state action. So we have international anarchy and then two degrees of global pluralism.

On the left, I have so far marked off only two arrangements, moving in the direction of greater division but maintaining the idea of a single centre. The first is the global state, the least divided of imaginable regimes, where the members are individual men and women. The second is the global empire, where the members are the subject nations. The hegemony of the imperial nation divides it from all the others, without abolishing the others.

The next step in from the left brings with it the end of subjection: the new arrangement is a federation of nation-states. The strength of the centre, of the federal government, will depend on the rights freely ceded to it by the member states and on the direct or indirect character of its jurisdiction over individual citizens. Defenders of what Americans call "states' rights" will argue for a mediated jurisdiction. Obviously, the greater the mediation the more this arrangement moves rightward on the continuum. If the mediation disappears entirely, we are back at the left end, in the global state. What we need to imagine in order to make sense of this federal regime is a surrender of sovereignty by the particular states and then a constitutionally guaranteed functional division of power, such that the states are left with significant responsibilities and the means to fulfill them — a version, then, of the American system (different, no doubt, in many of its features), projected internationally.



A greatly strengthened United Nations, incorporating the World Bank and the World Court, might approximate this model, so long as it had the power to coerce member states that refused to abide by its resolutions and verdicts. If the UN retained its current structure, with the Security Council as it is now constituted, the global federation would be an oligarchy or perhaps, since the General Assembly represents a kind of democracy, a mixed regime. It isn't easy to imagine any other sort of federation given the current inequalities of wealth and power among states.

These inequalities are probably harder to deal with than any political differences among the states. Even if all the states were republics, as Kant hoped they would be, the federation would still be wholly or partly oligarchic, so long as the existing distribution of resources was unchanged. And oligarchy here represents division; it drastically qualifies the powers of the centre. By contrast, the political character of the member states would tend to become more and more similar. Here the move would be toward unity or, at least, uniformity, for all the states would be incorporated into the same constitutional structure, bound, for example, by the same codes of social and political rights. And they would be far less able than they are today to ignore those rights. Citizens who think themselves oppressed would quickly appeal to the federal (global) courts and presumably find quick redress. Even if the member states were not democracies to start with, they would become uniformly democratic over time.

As a democrat I ought to find this outcome more attractive than I do. The problem is that it's more likely to be reached and sustained by pressure from the centre than by democratic activism at (to shift my metaphor) the grass roots. My own preference for democracy doesn't extend to a belief that this preference should be uniformly enforced on every political community. Democracy has to be reached through a political process that, in its nature, can also produce different results.

When these results threaten human life and liberty, some kind of intervention will be necessary, but they won't always do that, and when they don't the different political formations that emerge must be given room to develop (and change). But could a global federation make its peace with political pluralism?

It is far more likely to make its peace with material inequality. A federal regime would probably redistribute resources, but only within limits set by its oligarchs (once again, the European Community provides examples). The greater the power acquired by the central government, obviously, the more redistribution there is likely to be. But this kind of power would be dangerous to all the member states, not only to the wealthiest among them. It isn't clear how to strike the balance. Presumably that would be one of the central issues in the internal politics of the federation (but there wouldn't be any other politics since, by definition, nothing lies outside the federation).

Constitutional guarantees would serve to protect national and ethnic/religious groups. This seems to be Kant's assumption: "In such a league, every nation, even the smallest, can expect to have security and rights..." (*Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent*, Seventh Thesis). In fact, however, only those groups that achieved sovereignty before the federation was formed would have a sure place within it. (This might be an argument for the maximal development of international anarchy before any attempt is made to form a federation, except that no one can determine the timing of federalist opportunities.) So there would have to be some procedure for recognizing and securing the rights of new groups, as well as a code of rights for individuals without regard to their group membership. Conceivably, the federal regime would turn out to be a strong guardian of both eccentric groups and individuals — as in the United States, for example, where embattled minorities and idiosyncratic citizens commonly appeal to the central government when they are mistreated by local authorities.



When such an appeal doesn't work, however, Americans have options that would not be available to the citizens of a global union: they can carry their appeal to the UN or the World Court, or they can move to another country. There is still something to be said for division and pluralism.

Now let's take another step in from the right side and try to imagine what may be impossible: a coherent form of division. I have in mind the familiar anarchy of states mitigated and controlled by a threefold set of nonstate agents: organizations like the UN, the associations of international civil society, and also regional unions like the European Community. This is the third degree of global pluralism, and in its fully developed (ideal) version, it may well offer the largest number of opportunities for political action on behalf of peace, justice, cultural difference, and individual rights; and it may pose, at the same time, the smallest risks of global tyranny. Of course, opportunities for action are no more than that. They bring no guarantees, and conflicts are sure to arise among men and women pursuing these different values. I imagine this last regime as providing a context for politics in its fullest sense (and conflict is included in that fullness) and for the widest engagement of ordinary citizens, with citizenship understood in the most highly differentiated way.

Consider again the difficulties posed by the first six regimes: in some of them it is the decentred world and the self-centred states inhabiting it (whether the states themselves are strong or weak) that threaten our values; in others it is the tyrannical potential of the newly constituted centre that poses together the politics of international society. But they would never constitute a single centre; they would always represent multiple sources of political energy; they would always be diversely focused.

Now add a new layer of governmental organization — the regional federation, of which the European Community is only one possible model. It is necessary to imagine both tighter and looser structures, distributed across the globe, perhaps even with overlapping memberships — differently constituted federal unions in different parts of the world. This sort of thing would bring many of the advantages of a global federation but with greatly reduced risks of tyranny from the centre. For it is a crucial feature of regionalism that there will be many centres.

V

To appreciate the beauty of pluralist arrangements of this kind, one must attach a greater value to political possibility, and the activism it breeds, than to the certainty of political success. To my mind, certainty is always a fantasy, but I don't want to deny that something is lost when one gives up the more unitary versions of globalism. What is lost is the hope of creating a more egalitarian world with a stroke of the pen — a single legislative act enforced from a single centre. What is lost is the hope of achieving perpetual peace, that is, the end of conflict and violence, everywhere and forever. What is lost is the hope of a singular citizenship and a singular identity for all human individuals — so that they would be autonomous men and women, and nothing else.

I must hurry to deny what the argument so far may suggest to many readers/listeners: I don't mean to sacrifice all these hopes solely for the sake of what is today called 'communitarianism' — that is, for the sake of cultural and religious difference. That last is an important value, and it is no doubt well-served by the third degree of pluralism (indeed, the different levels of government allow new opportunities for self-expression and autonomy to minority groups hitherto subordinated within the nation-state).



But difference exists alongside equality, peace, and autonomy; it doesn't supersede them. My argument is that all these values are best pursued politically in circumstances where there are many avenues of pursuit, many agents in pursuit. The dream of a single agent — the enlightened despot, the civilizing imperium, the communist vanguard, the global state — is a delusion. We need many many agents, many arenas of activity and decision. Political values have to be defended in many different places so that failure here can be a spur to action there, and success there a model for imitation or revision here.

But there will be failures as well as successes, and before concluding this lecture, I need to mention and at least briefly worry about three possible failures — so as to stress that all the arrangements, including the one I prefer, have their dangers and disadvantages. The first is the possible failure of peacekeeping, which is also, today, a failure to secure cultural difference. Wars between and among states will be rare in a densely webbed international society. But the very success of the politics of difference makes for internal conflicts that tend toward and sometimes reach 'ethnic cleansing' and even genocidal civil war. The claim of all the strongly centred regimes is that this sort of thing will be stopped, but the price of doing this, and of maintaining the capacity to do it, is very high. The danger of all the decentred and multicentred regimes is that no one will stop the awfulness. The third degree of pluralism maximizes the number of agents who might stop it or at least mitigate its effects: individual states acting unilaterally, alliances and unions of states (like NATO in the Kosovo war), global organizations like the UN, the volunteers of international civil society. But there is no assigned agent, no singular responsibility. Everything waits for political debate and determination — and may wait too long.

The second possible failure is in the promotion of equality. Here too the third degree of pluralism provides many opportunities for egalitarian reform, and there will surely be many experiments in different societies or at different levels of

government (like the Israeli kibbutz or the Scandinavian welfare state). But the forces that oppose equality will never have to face the massed power of the globally dispossessed, for there won't be a global arena where this power can be massed. What there will be, or could be, is very different: many organizations that seek to mobilize the dispossessed and express their aspirations, sometimes cooperating, sometimes competing with one another.

The third possible failure is in the defence of individual liberty. Once again, the pluralism of states, cultures, and religions — even if full sovereignty no longer exists anywhere — means that individuals in different settings will be differently entitled and empowered. We can (and should) defend some minimal understanding of human rights and seek its universal enforcement, but enforcement in the third degree of pluralism would necessarily involve many different agents, hence many arguments and many decisions, and the results are bound to be uneven.

Can it possibly be the case that a regime open to such failures is the most just regime? I only want to argue that it is the political arrangement that most facilitates the everyday pursuit of justice under conditions least dangerous to the over all cause of justice. All the other regimes are worse, including the one on the far left of the continuum for which the highest hopes have been held out. For it is a mistake to imagine Reason in power in a global state — as great a mistake (and a mistake of the same kind) as to imagine the future world order as a millennial kingdom where God is the king. The rulers required by regimes of this kind don't exist or, at least, don't manifest themselves politically. By contrast, the move toward pluralism suits people like us, all-too-real and no more than intermittently reasonable, for whom politics is 'natural'.

Finally, I must insist that the move toward pluralism really is a *move*. We are not there yet. We have, in the words of the American poet Robert Frost, "many miles to go before we rest." The kinds of governmental agencies that are needed in an age of globalization haven't yet been developed; the



level of participation in international civil society is much too low; regional federations are still in their beginning stages. Reforms in these institutional areas, however, are rarely sought for their own sake.

No one is sufficiently interested. We will strengthen global pluralism only by using it, by seizing the opportunities it offers. There won't be an advance at any institutional level except in the context of a campaign or, better, a series of campaigns for greater equality and greater security for groups and individuals across the globe.