

Red Skin, White Masks

Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition

Glen Sean Coulthard

Foreword by Taiaiake Alfred

INDIGENOUS AMERICAS



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INTRODUCTION

Subjects of Empire

Real recognition of our presence and humanity would require a genuine reconsideration of so many people's role in North American society that it would amount to a genuine leap of imagination.

—GEORGE MANUEL and MICHAEL POSLUNS,
The Fourth World

FROM "WARDS OF THE STATE" TO SUBJECTS OF RECOGNITION?

Over the last forty years, the self-determination efforts and objectives of Indigenous peoples in Canada have increasingly been cast in the language of "recognition."¹ Consider, for example, the formative declaration issued by my people in 1975:

We the Dene of the NWT [Northwest Territories] insist on the right to be regarded by ourselves and the world as a nation.

Our struggle is for the *recognition* of the Dene Nation by the Government and people of Canada and the peoples and governments of the world. . . .

And while there are realities we are forced to submit to, such as the existence of a country called Canada, we insist on the right to self-determination and the *recognition* of the Dene Nation.²

Now fast-forward to the 2005 policy position on self-determination issued by Canada's largest Aboriginal organization, the Assembly of First Nations (AFN). According to the AFN, "a consensus has emerged . . . around a vision of the relationship between First Nations and Canada which would lead to strengthening recognition and implementation of First Nations' governments."³ This "vision," the AFN goes on to explain, draws on the core principles outlined in the 1996 *Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples* (RCAP): that is, recognition of the nation-to-nation relationship between First Nations

and the Crown; recognition of the equal right of First Nations to self-determination; recognition of the Crown's fiduciary obligation to protect Aboriginal treaty rights; recognition of First Nations' inherent right to self-government; and recognition of the right of First Nations to economically benefit from the use and development of their lands and resources.⁴ Since 2005 the AFN has consistently reasserted and affirmed these guiding principles at its Annual General Assemblies and in the numerous resolutions that these gatherings have produced.

These demands have not been easy to ignore. Because of the persistence and dedication of countless Indigenous activists, leaders, communities, and organizations, we have witnessed within the scope of four decades the emergence of an unprecedented degree of recognition for Aboriginal "cultural" rights within the legal and political framework of the Canadian state.⁵ Most significant on this front was Canada's eventual "recognition" of "existing aboriginal and treaty rights" under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act of 1982. This constitutional breakthrough provided the catalyst that led to the federal government's eventual recognition, in 1995, of an "inherent right to self-government,"⁶ as well as the groundswell of post-1982 court challenges that have sought to both clarify and widen the scope of what constitutes a constitutionally recognized Aboriginal right to begin with. When considered from the vantage point of these important developments, it would certainly appear that "recognition" has emerged as the dominant expression of self-determination within the Aboriginal rights movement in Canada.

The struggle for recognition has become a central catalyst in the international Indigenous rights movement as well. As the works of Will Kymlicka, Sheryl Lightfoot, Ronald Neizen, and others have noted, the last three decades have witnessed the emergence of recognition-based approaches to Indigenous self-determination in the field of Indigenous-state relations in Asia, northern Europe, throughout the Americas, and across the South Pacific (including Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands).⁷ Although varying in institutional scope and scale, all of these geopolitical regions have seen the establishment of Indigenous rights regimes that claim to recognize and accommodate the political autonomy, land rights, and cultural distinctiveness of Indigenous nations within the settler states that now encase them. Although my primary empirical focus in *Red Skin, White Masks* is Canada, I suspect that readers will find many of my conclusions applicable to settler-colonial experiences elsewhere.

On a more discursive plane, the increase in recognition demands made by Indigenous and other marginalized minorities over the last forty years has also prompted a flurry of intellectual activity that has sought to unpack the complex ethical, political, and legal questions that these types of claims raise. To date, much of this literature has tended to focus on a perceived relationship between the affirmative recognition and institutional accommodation of societal cultural differences on the one hand, and the freedom and autonomy of marginalized individuals and groups living in ethnically diverse states on the other. In Canada it has been argued that this synthesis of theory and practice has forced the state to dramatically reconceptualize the tenets of its relationship with Indigenous peoples; whereas before 1969 federal Indian policy was unapologetically assimilationist, now it is couched in the vernacular of “mutual recognition.”⁸

In the following chapters I critically engage a multiplicity of diverse anti-imperialist traditions and practices to challenge the increasingly commonplace idea that the colonial relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Canadian state can be adequately transformed via such a politics of recognition. Following the work of Richard J. F. Day, I take “politics of recognition” to refer to the now expansive range of recognition-based models of liberal pluralism that seek to “reconcile” Indigenous assertions of nationhood with settler-state sovereignty via the accommodation of Indigenous identity claims in some form of renewed legal and political relationship with the Canadian state.⁹ Although these models tend to vary in both theory and practice, most call for the delegation of land, capital, and political power from the state to Indigenous communities through a combination of land claim settlements, economic development initiatives, and self-government agreements. These are subsequently the three broad contexts through which I examine the theory and practice of Indigenous recognition politics in the following chapters. Against this variant of the recognition approach, I argue that instead of ushering in an era of peaceful coexistence grounded on the ideal of *reciprocity* or *mutual* recognition, the politics of recognition in its contemporary liberal form promises to reproduce the very configurations of colonialist, racist, patriarchal state power that Indigenous peoples’ demands for recognition have historically sought to transcend.

To demonstrate the above claim, *Red Skin, White Masks* will theoretically and empirically map the contours of what I consider to be a decisive shift in

the modus operandi of colonial power following the hegemonization of the recognition paradigm following the release of the federal government's infamous *Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy*—also known as the “White Paper”—in 1969.¹⁰ In the two centuries leading to this historic policy proposal—which called for the blanket assimilation of the status Indian population by unilaterally removing all institutionally enshrined aspects of legal and political differentiation that distinguish First Nations from non-Native Canadians under the Indian Act—the reproduction of the colonial relationship between Indigenous peoples and what would eventually become Canada depended heavily on the deployment of state power geared around genocidal practices of forced *exclusion* and *assimilation*.¹¹ Any cursory examination into the character of colonial Indian policy during this period will attest to this fact. For example, this era witnessed Canada's repeated attempts to overtly uproot and destroy the vitality and autonomy of Indigenous modes of life through institutions such as residential schools;¹² through the imposition of settler-state policies aimed at explicitly undercutting Indigenous political economies and relations to and with land;¹³ through the violent dispossession of First Nation women's rights to land and community membership under sexist provisions of the Indian Act;¹⁴ through the theft of Aboriginal children via racist child welfare policies;¹⁵ and through the near wholesale dispossession of Indigenous peoples' territories and modes of traditional governance in exchange for delegated administrative powers to be exercised over relatively minuscule reserve lands. All of these policies sought to marginalize Indigenous people and communities with the ultimate goal being our *elimination*, if not physically, then as cultural, political, and legal *peoples* distinguishable from the rest of Canadian society.¹⁶ These initiatives reflect the more or less un-concealed, unilateral, and coercive nature of colonial rule during most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Although Indigenous people and communities have always found ways to individually and collectively resist these oppressive policies and practices, it was not until the tumultuous political climate of Red Power activism in the 1960s and 70s that policies geared toward the recognition and so-called “reconciliation” of Native land and political grievances with state sovereignty began to appear. Three watershed events are generally recognized as shaping this era of Native activism in Canada. The first was the materialization of widespread First Nation opposition to the previously mentioned 1969 White

Paper. Instead of serving as a bridge to passive assimilation, the White Paper inaugurated an unprecedented degree of pan-Indian assertiveness and political mobilization. The National Indian Brotherhood (now the Assembly of First Nations) issued the following response to the federal government's proposed initiative: "We view this as a policy designed to divest us of our aboriginal . . . rights. If we accept this policy, and in the process lose our rights and our lands, we become willing partners in cultural genocide. This we cannot do."¹⁷ Although designed as a once-and-for-all solution to Canada's so-called "Indian Problem," the White Paper instead became a central catalyst around which the contemporary Indigenous self-determination movement coalesced, "launching it into a determined [defense] of a unique cultural heritage and identity."¹⁸ The sheer magnitude of First Nations' resistance to the White Paper proposal forced the federal government to formally shelve the document on March 17, 1971.¹⁹

The second watershed event occurred following the partial recognition of Aboriginal "title" in the Supreme Court of Canada's 1973 *Calder* decision.²⁰ This landmark case, which involved a claim launched by Nisga'a hereditary chief Frank Calder to the un-extinguished territories of his nation in northwestern British Columbia, overturned a seventy-five-year precedent first established in *St Catherine's Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen* (1888), which stated that Aboriginal land rights existed only insofar and to the extent that the state recognized them as such.²¹ Although technically a defeat for the Nisga'a, the six justices that rendered substantive decisions in *Calder* all agreed that, prior to contact, the Nisga'a indeed held the land rights they claimed in court.²² The question then quickly shifted to whether these rights were sufficiently extinguished through colonial legislation. In the end, three justices ruled that the Aboriginal rights in question had not been extinguished, three ruled that they had, and one justice ruled against the Nisga'a based on a technical question regarding whether this type of action could be levelled against the province without legislation permitting it, which he ruled could not.²³ Thus, even though the Nisga'a technically lost their case in a 4–3 decision, the Supreme Court's ruling in *Calder* left enough uncertainty around the question of existing Aboriginal rights that it prompted a shift in the federal government's policy vis-à-vis Native land interests. The result was the federal government's 1973 *Statement on Claims of Indian and Inuit People: A Federal Native Claims Policy*, which effectively reversed fifty-two years (since the 1921 signing

of Treaty 11 in the Northwest Territories with the Sahtu Dene) of state refusal to recognize Indigenous claims to land where the question of existing title remained open.²⁴

The third event (or rather cluster of events) emerged following the turbulent decade of energy politics that followed the oil crisis of the early 1970s, which subsequently fueled an aggressive push by state and industry to develop what it saw as the largely untapped resource potential (natural gas, minerals, and oil) of northern Canada.²⁵ The federal government's holding of 45 percent equity in Panartic Oils led Indian Affairs minister Jean Chrétien to state that "it is very seldom in public life that a minister of a government presides over that kind of profit."²⁶ The proposed increase in northern development was envisioned despite concerns raised by the Métis, Dene, and Inuit of the Northwest Territories regarding Canada's proposal to sanction the development of a huge natural gas pipeline to be carved across the heartland of our traditional territories, as well as the resistance mounted by the Cree of northern Quebec against a similarly massive hydroelectric project proposed for their homeland in the James Bay region.²⁷ The effectiveness of our subsequent political struggles, which gained unprecedented media coverage across the country, once again raised the issue of unresolved Native rights and title issues to the fore of Canadian public consciousness.

In the following chapters I will show that colonial rule underwent a profound shift in the wake of these important events. More specifically, I argue that the expression of Indigenous anticolonial nationalism that emerged during this period forced colonial power to modify itself from a structure that was once primarily reinforced by policies, techniques, and ideologies explicitly oriented around the genocidal exclusion/assimilation double, to one that is now reproduced through a seemingly more conciliatory set of discourses and institutional practices that emphasize our *recognition* and *accommodation*. Regardless of this modification, however, the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the state has remained *colonial* to its foundation.

KARL MARX, SETTLER-COLONIALISM, AND INDIGENOUS DISPOSSESSION IN POST-WHITE PAPER CANADA

What do I mean by a *colonial*—or more precisely, *settler-colonial* relationship? A settler-colonial relationship is one characterized by a particular form of *domination*; that is, it is a relationship where power—in this case, interrelated

discursive and nondiscursive facets of economic, gendered, racial, and state power—has been structured into a relatively secure or sedimented set of hierarchical social relations that continue to facilitate the *dispossession* of Indigenous peoples of their lands and self-determining authority. In this respect, Canada is no different from most other settler-colonial powers: in the Canadian context, colonial domination continues to be structurally committed to maintain—through force, fraud, and more recently, so-called “negotiations”—ongoing state access to the land and resources that contradictorily provide the material and spiritual sustenance of Indigenous societies on the one hand, and the foundation of colonial state-formation, settlement, and capitalist development on the other. As Patrick Wolfe states, “Whatever settlers may say—and they generally have a lot to say—the primary motive [of settler-colonialism] is not race (or religion, ethnicity, grade of civilization, etc.) but access to territory. Territoriality is settler colonialism’s specific, irreducible element.”²⁸

In thinking about colonialism as a form of structured dispossession, I have found it useful to return to a cluster of insights developed by Karl Marx in chapters 26 through 32 of his first volume of *Capital*.²⁹ This section of *Capital* is crucial because it is there that Marx most thoroughly links the totalizing power of *capital* with that of *colonialism* by way of his theory of “primitive accumulation.” Challenging the idyllic portrayal of capitalism’s origins by economists like Adam Smith, Marx’s chapters on primitive accumulation highlight the gruesomely violent nature of the transition from feudal to capitalist social relations in western Europe (with an emphasis placed on England). Marx’s historical excavation of the birth of the capitalist mode of production identifies a host of colonial-like state practices that served to violently strip—through “conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder”³⁰—noncapitalist producers, communities, and societies from their means of production and subsistence. In *Capital* these formative acts of violent *dispossession* set the stage for the emergence of capitalist accumulation and the reproduction of capitalist relations of production by tearing Indigenous societies, peasants, and other small-scale, self-sufficient agricultural producers from the source of their livelihood—the *land*. It was this horrific process that established the two necessary preconditions underwriting the capital relation itself: it forcefully opened up what were once collectively held territories and resources to privatization (dispossession and enclosure), which, over time, came to produce a “class” of workers compelled to enter the exploitative realm of the labor market for their survival

(proletarianization). The historical process of primitive accumulation thus refers to the violent transformation of noncapitalist forms of life into capitalist ones.

The critical purchase of Marx's primitive accumulation thesis for analyzing the relationship between colonial rule and capitalist accumulation in the contemporary period has been the subject of much debate over the last couple of decades. Within and between the fields of Indigenous studies and Marxist political economy, these debates have at times been hostile and polarizing. At its worst, this hostility has led to the premature rejection of Marx and Marxism by some Indigenous studies scholars on the one side, and to the belligerent, often ignorant, and sometimes racist dismissal of Indigenous peoples' contributions to radical thought and politics by Marxists on the other.³¹ At their nondogmatic best, however, I believe that the conversations that continue to occur within and between these two diverse fields of critical inquiry (especially when placed in dialog with feminist, anarchist, queer, and post-colonial traditions) have the potential to shed much insight into the cycles of colonial domination and resistance that characterize the relationship between white settler states and Indigenous peoples.

To my mind, then, for Indigenous peoples to reject or ignore the insights of Marx would be a mistake, especially if this amounts to a refusal on our part to critically engage his important critique of capitalist exploitation and his extensive writings on the entangled relationship between capitalism and colonialism. As Tsimshian anthropologist Charles Menzies writes, "Marxism retains an incisive core that helps understand the dynamics of the world we live." It "highlights the ways in which power is structured through ownership" and exposes the state's role "in the accumulation of capital and the redistribution of wealth from the many to the few."³² All of this is not to suggest, however, that Marx's contributions are without flaw; nor is it meant to suggest that Marxism provides a ready-made tool for Indigenous peoples to uncritically appropriate in their struggles for land and freedom. As suggested above, rendering Marx's theoretical frame relevant to a comprehensive understanding of settler-colonialism and Indigenous resistance requires that it be transformed *in conversation* with the critical thought and practices of Indigenous peoples themselves. In the spirit of fostering this critical dialog, I suggest that three problematic features of Marx's primitive accumulation thesis are in need of such a transformation.

The first feature involves what many critics have characterized as Marx's rigidly *temporal* framing of the phenomenon. As early as 1899, for example, anarchist geographer Peter Kropotkin made note of what seemed to be an "erroneous division" drawn in Marx "between the *primary* [or primitive] accumulation of capital and its *present day formulation*."³³ The critical point here, which many contemporary writers have subsequently picked up on, is that Marx tended to portray primitive accumulation as if it constituted "a process confined to a particular (if indefinite) period—one already largely passed in England, but still underway in the colonies at the time Marx wrote."³⁴ For Marx, although the era of violent, state dispossession may have *inaugurated* the accumulation process, in the end it is "the silent compulsion of economic relations" that ultimately "sets the seal on the domination of the capitalist over the worker."³⁵ This formulation, however, clearly does not conform well to our present global reality. As the recent work of scholars as diverse as David Harvey, Silvia Federici, Taiaiake Alfred, Rauna Kuokkanen, and Andrea Smith (to name but a few) have highlighted, the escalating onslaught of violent, state-orchestrated enclosures following neoliberalism's ascent to hegemony has unmistakably demonstrated the *persistent* role that unconcealed, violent dispossession continues to play in the reproduction of colonial and capitalist social relations in both the domestic and global contexts.³⁶

The second feature that needs to be addressed concerns the *normative developmentalism* that problematically underscored Marx's *original* formulation of the primitive accumulation thesis. I stress "original" here because Marx began to reformulate this teleological aspect of his thought in the last decade of his life, and this reformulation has important implications with respect to how we ought to conceptualize the struggles of non-Western societies against the violence that has defined our encounter with colonial modernity. For much of his career, however, Marx propagated within his writings a typically nineteenth-century modernist view of history and historical progress. This developmentalist ontology provided the overarching frame from which thinkers as diverse as Immanuel Kant, Georg W. F. Hegel, John Stuart Mill, and Adam Smith sought to unpack and historically rank variation in "human cultural forms and modes of production" according to each form's "approximation to the full development of the human good."³⁷ As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri point out, this modernist commitment often led Marx (along with Engels) to depict those non-Western societies deemed to be positioned

at the lower end of this scale of historical or cultural development as “people without history,” existing “separate from the development of capital and locked in an immutable present without the capacity for historical innovation.”³⁸ As a result, Marx’s most influential work tends to not only portray primitive accumulation as a historical phenomenon in the sense that it constituted a prior or transitional stage in the development of the capitalist mode of production, but that it was also a historically *inevitable* process that would ultimately have a *beneficial* effect on those violently drawn into the capitalist circuit. Take, for instance, Marx’s often quoted 1853 *New York Tribune* writings on colonial rule in India. There he suggests that, although vile and barbaric in practice, colonial dispossession would nonetheless have the “revolutionary” effect of bringing the “despotic,” “undignified,” and “stagnant” life of the Indians into the fold of capitalist-modernity and thus onto the one true path of human development—socialism.³⁹ Just as Hegel had infamously asserted before him that Africa exists at the “threshold of World History” with “no movement or development to exhibit,” Marx would similarly come to declare that “Indian society has no history at all, at least no known history.”⁴⁰ Clearly, any analysis or critique of contemporary settler-colonialism must be stripped of this Eurocentric feature of Marx’s original historical metanarrative.⁴¹

But this still raises the question of *how* to address this residual feature of Marx’s analysis. For our purposes here, I suggest that this can most effectively be accomplished by *contextually shifting* our investigation from an emphasis on the *capital relation* to the *colonial relation*. As suggested in his critical appraisal of Edward G. Wakefield’s 1849 text, *A View of the Art of Colonization*, Marx was primarily interested in colonialism because it exposed some “truth” about the nature of capitalism.⁴² His interest in the specific character of colonial domination was largely incidental. This is clearly evident in his position on primitive accumulation. As noted already, primitive accumulation involved a dual process for Marx: the accumulation of capital through violent state dispossession resulting in proletarianization. The weight given to these constituent elements, however, is by no means equal in Marx. As he explicitly states in chapter 33 of *Capital*, Marx had little interest in the condition of the “colonies” as such; rather, what caught his attention was “the secret discovered in the New World by the political economy of the Old World, and loudly proclaimed by it: that the capitalist mode of production and accumulation, and therefore capitalist private property as well, have for their fundamental condition the . . .

expropriation of the worker” (emphasis added).⁴³ When examined from this angle, colonial dispossession appears to constitute an appropriate object of critique and analysis only insofar as it unlocks the key to understanding the nature of capitalism: that capital is not a “thing,” but rather a “social relation” dependent on the perpetual separation of workers from the means of production.⁴⁴ This was obviously Marx’s primary concern, and it has subsequently remained the dominant concern of the Marxist tradition as a whole.⁴⁵ The contextual shift advocated here, by contrast, takes as its analytical frame the subject position of the colonized vis-à-vis the effects of *colonial dispossession*, rather than from the primary position of “the waged male proletariat [in] the process of commodity production,”⁴⁶ to borrow Silvia Federici’s useful formulation.

At least four critical insights into our settler-colonial present emerge from the resolution of these first two problems. First, by making the contextual shift in analysis from the capital-relation to the colonial-relation the inherent injustice of colonial rule is posited *on its own terms and in its own right*. By repositioning the colonial frame as our overarching lens of analysis it becomes far more difficult to justify in antiquated developmental terms (from either the right or the left) the assimilation of noncapitalist, non-Western, Indigenous modes of life based on the racist assumption that this assimilation will somehow magically redeem itself by bringing the fruits of capitalist modernity into the supposedly “backward” world of the colonized.⁴⁷ In a certain respect, this was also the guiding insight that eventually led Marx to reformulate his theory after 1871. Subsequently, in the last decade of his life, Marx no longer condemns non-Western and noncapitalist social formations to necessarily pass through the destructive phase of capitalist development as the condition of possibility for human freedom and flourishing. During this period, Marx had not only come to view more clearly how certain features of noncapitalist and capitalist modes of production “articulate” (albeit asymmetrically) in a given social formation, but also the ways in which aspects of the former can come to inform the construction of radical alternatives to the latter.⁴⁸

A similar insight informed Kropotkin’s early critique of Marx as well. The problem for Kropotkin was that Marx not only drew an “erroneous division” between the history of state dispossession and what has proven to be its persistent role in the accumulation process, but that this also seemed to justify in crude developmentalist terms the violent dispossession of place-based, non-state modes of self-sufficient Indigenous economic, political, and social

activity, only this time to be carried out under the auspices of the coercive authority of *socialist* states. This form of dispossession would eventually come to be championed by Soviet imperialists under the banner *socialist primitive accumulation*.⁴⁹ I suggest that by shifting our analytical frame to the colonial relation we might occupy a better angle from which to both anticipate and interrogate practices of settler-state dispossession justified under otherwise egalitarian principles and espoused with so-called “progressive” political agendas in mind. Instead, what must be recognized by those inclined to advocate a blanket “return of the commons” as a redistributive counterstrategy to the neoliberal state’s new round of enclosures, is that, in liberal settler states such as Canada, the “commons” not only belong to somebody—the *First Peoples of this land*—they also deeply inform and sustain Indigenous modes of thought and behavior that harbor profound insights into the maintenance of relationships within and between human beings and the natural world built on principles of reciprocity, nonexploitation and respectful coexistence. By ignoring or downplaying the injustice of colonial dispossession, critical theory and left political strategy not only risks becoming complicit in the very structures and processes of domination that it ought to oppose, but it also risks overlooking what could prove to be invaluable glimpses into the ethical practices and preconditions required for the construction of a more just and sustainable world order.

The second insight facilitated by this contextual shift has to do with the role played by Indigenous labor in the historical process of colonial-capital accumulation in Canada. It is now generally acknowledged among historians and political economists that following the waves of colonial settlement that marked the transition between mercantile and industrial capitalism (roughly spanning the years 1860–1914, but with significant variation between geographical regions), Native labor became increasingly (although by no means entirely) superfluous to the political and economic development of the Canadian state.⁵⁰ Increased European settlement combined with an imported, hyper-exploited non-European workforce meant that, in the post-fur trade period, Canadian state-formation and colonial-capitalist development required first and foremost *land*, and only secondarily the surplus value afforded by cheap, Indigenous labor.⁵¹ This is not to suggest, however, that the long-term goal of indoctrinating the Indigenous population to the principles of private property, possessive individualism, and menial wage work did not constitute an

important feature of Canadian Indian policy. It did. As the commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1890 wrote: “The work of sub-dividing reserves has begun in earnest. The policy of destroying the tribal or communist system is assailed in every possible way and every effort [has been] made to implant a spirit of individual responsibility instead.”⁵²

When this historical consideration is situated alongside the contemporary fact that there has been, first, a steady increase in Native migration to urban centers over the last few decades, and, second, that many First Nation communities are situated on or near lands coveted by the resource exploitation industry, it is reasonable to conclude that disciplining Indigenous life to the cold rationality of market principles will remain on state and industry’s agenda for some time to follow.⁵³ In this respect Marx’s thesis still stands. What I want to point out, rather, is that when related back to the primitive accumulation thesis it appears that the history and experience of *dispossession*, not proletarianization, has been the dominant background structure shaping the character of the historical relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Canadian state. Just as importantly, I would also argue that dispossession continues to inform the dominant modes of Indigenous resistance and critique that this relationship has provoked. Stated bluntly, the theory and practice of Indigenous anticolonialism, including Indigenous anticapitalism, is best understood as a struggle primarily inspired by and oriented around *the question of land*—a struggle not only *for* land in the material sense, but also deeply *informed* by what the land *as system of reciprocal relations and obligations* can teach us about living our lives in relation to one another and the natural world in nondominating and nonexploitative terms—and less around our emergent status as “rightless proletarians.”⁵⁴ I call this place-based foundation of Indigenous decolonial thought and practice *grounded normativity*, by which I mean the modalities of Indigenous land-connected practices and longstanding experiential knowledge that inform and structure our ethical engagements with the world and our relationships with human and nonhuman others over time.

The third insight to flow from this contextual shift corresponds to a number of concerns expressed by Indigenous peoples, deep ecologists, defenders of animal rights, and other advocates of environmental sustainability regarding perceived “anti-ecological” tendencies in Marx’s work. Although this field of criticism tends to be internally diverse—and some have argued, overstated (I am thinking here of eco-socialists like Joel Kovel and John Bellamy Foster)—

at its core it suggests that Marx's perspectives on nature adhered to an instrumental rationality that placed no intrinsic value on the land or nature itself, and that this subsequently led him to uncritically champion an ideology of productivism and unsustainable economic progress.⁵⁵ From the vantage point of the capital relationship—which, I have argued, tends to concern itself most with the adverse structural and ideological effects stemming from expropriated labor—*land is not exploitable, people are*. I believe that reestablishing the colonial relation of dispossession as a co-foundational feature of our understanding of and critical engagement with capitalism opens up the possibility of developing a more ecologically attentive critique of colonial-capitalist accumulation, especially if this engagement takes its cues from the grounded normativity of Indigenous modalities of place-based resistance and criticism.

And finally, the fourth insight that flows from the contextual shift advocated here involves what many have characterized as Marx's (and orthodox Marxism's) economic reductionism. It should be clear in the following pages that there is much more at play in the contemporary reproduction of settler-colonial social relations than capitalist economics; most notably, the host of interrelated yet semi-autonomous facets of discursive and nondiscursive power briefly identified earlier. Although it is beyond question that the predatory nature of capitalism continues to play a vital role in facilitating the ongoing dispossession of Indigenous peoples in Canada, it is necessary to recognize that it only does so *in relation to or in concert with* axes of exploitation and domination configured along racial, gender, and state lines. Given the resilience of these equally devastating modalities of power, I argue that any strategy geared toward authentic decolonization must directly confront more than mere economic relations; it has to account for the multifarious ways in which capitalism, patriarchy, white supremacy, and the totalizing character of state power interact with one another to form the constellation of power relations that sustain colonial patterns of behavior, structures, and relationships. I suggest that shifting our attention to the colonial frame is one way to facilitate this form of radical intersectional analysis.⁵⁶ Seen from this light, the colonial relation should not be understood as a primary locus or "base" from which these other forms of oppression flow, but rather as the inherited background field within which market, racist, patriarchal, and state relations *converge* to facilitate a certain power effect—in our case, the reproduction of hierarchical social relations that facilitate the dispossession of our lands and self-determining

capacities. Like capital, colonialism, as a structure of domination predicated on dispossession, is not “a thing,” but rather the sum effect of the diversity of interlocking oppressive social relations that constitute it. When stated this way, it should be clear that shifting our position to highlight the ongoing effects of colonial dispossession in no way displaces questions of distributive justice or class struggle; rather, it simply situates these questions more firmly alongside and in relation to the other sites and relations of power that inform our settler-colonial present.

With these four insights noted, I can now turn to the third and final feature that needs to be addressed with respect to Marx’s primitive accumulation thesis. This one, which constitutes the core theoretical intervention of this book, brings us back to my original claim that, in the Canadian context, colonial relations of power are no longer reproduced primarily through overtly coercive means, but rather through the asymmetrical exchange of mediated forms of state recognition and accommodation. This is obviously quite different from the story Marx tells, where the driving force behind dispossession and accumulation is initially that of *violence*: it is a relationship of brute “force,” of “servitude,” whose methods, Marx claims, are “anything but idyllic.”⁵⁷ The strategic deployment of violent sovereign power, then, serves the primary reproductive function in the accumulation process in Marx’s writings on colonialism. As Marx himself bluntly put it, these gruesome state practices are what thrust capitalism onto the world stage, “dripping from head to toe, from every pore, in blood and dirt.”⁵⁸

The question that needs to be asked in our context, however, and the question to which I provide an answer in the following chapters, is this: what are we to make of contexts where state violence no longer constitutes the regulative norm governing the process of colonial dispossession, as appears to be the case in ostensibly tolerant, multinational, liberal settler polities such as Canada?⁵⁹ Stated in Marx’s own terms, if neither “blood and fire” nor the “silent compulsion” of capitalist economics can adequately account for the reproduction of colonial hierarchies in liberal democratic contexts, what can?

FRANTZ FANON AND THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION IN COLONIAL CONTEXTS

To elucidate precisely *how* colonial rule made the transition from a more-or-less unconcealed structure of domination to a mode of colonial *governmentality*

that works through the limited freedoms afforded by state recognition and accommodation, I will be drawing significantly (but not exclusively) on the work of anticolonial theorist, psychiatrist, and revolutionary Frantz Fanon.⁶⁰ At first blush, turning to Fanon to develop an understanding of the regulating mechanisms undergirding settler-colonial rule in contexts where state violence no longer constitutes the norm governing the process might seem a bit odd to those familiar with his work. After all, Fanon is arguably best known for the articulation of colonialism he develops in *The Wretched of the Earth*, where colonial rule is posited, much like Marx posited it before him, as a structure of dominance maintained through unrelenting and punishing forms of violence. “In colonial regions,” writes Fanon, the state “uses a language of *pure violence*. [It] does not alleviate oppression or mask domination.” Instead, “the proximity and frequent, direct intervention by the police and military ensure the colonized are kept under close scrutiny, and contained by rifle butts and napalm” (emphasis added).⁶¹ And considering Fanon wrote *The Wretched of the Earth* during one of the twentieth century’s most gruesome anticolonial struggles—the Algerian war of independence (1954–62)—it is not surprising that he placed so much emphasis on colonialism’s openly coercive and violent features. Given the severe nature of the colonial situation within which *The Wretched of the Earth* was produced one could argue that the diagnosis and prescriptions outlined in the text were tragically appropriate to the context they set out to address.

But this simply is not the case in contemporary Canada, and for this reason I begin my investigation with a sustained engagement with Fanon’s earlier work, *Black Skin, White Masks*. As we shall see in the following chapter, it is there that Fanon offers a groundbreaking critical analysis of the affirmative relationship drawn between recognition and freedom in the master/slave dialectic of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*—a critique I claim is equally applicable to contemporary liberal recognition-based approaches to Indigenous self-determination in Canada.⁶² Fanon’s analysis suggests that in contexts where colonial rule is not reproduced through force alone, the maintenance of settler-state hegemony requires the production of what he liked to call “colonized subjects”: namely, the production of the specific modes of colonial thought, desire, and behavior that implicitly or explicitly commit the colonized to the types of practices and subject positions that are required for their continued domination. However, unlike the liberalized appropriation of Hegel that continues to

inform many contemporary proponents of identity politics, in Fanon recognition is not posited as a source of freedom and dignity for the colonized, *but rather as the field of power through which colonial relations are produced and maintained*. This “is the form of recognition,” Fanon suggests, “that Hegel never described.”⁶³ Subsequently, this is also the form of recognition that I set out to interrogate in *Red Skin, White Masks*.

OUTLINE OF THE BOOK

With these preliminary remarks made, I will now provide a brief outline of the structure and chapter breakdown of the book. In chapter 1, I use Frantz Fanon’s critique of Hegel’s master/slave dialectic to challenge the now commonplace assumption that the structure of domination that frames Indigenous–state relations in Canada can be undermined via a liberal politics of recognition. I begin my analysis by identifying two Hegelian assumptions that continue to inform the politics of recognition today. The first, which is now uncontroversial, involves recognition’s perceived role in the constitution of human subjectivity: the notion that our identities are formed *intersubjectively* through our complex social interactions with other subjects. As Charles Taylor influentially asserts: the “crucial feature of human life is its fundamentally *dialogical* character. . . . We define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant others acknowledge in us.”⁶⁴ The second, more contentious assumption suggests that the specific structural or interpersonal character of our relations of recognition can have a positive (when mutual and affirmative) or detrimental (when unequal and disparaging) effect on our status as *free and self-determining agents*. I draw off Fanon’s work to partially challenge this second assumption by demonstrating the ways in which the purportedly diversity-affirming forms of state recognition and accommodation defended by some proponents of contemporary liberal recognition politics can subtly reproduce nonmutual and unfree relations rather than free and mutual ones. At its core, Fanon’s critique of colonial recognition politics can be summarized like this: when delegated exchanges of recognition occur in real world contexts of domination the terms of accommodation usually end up being determined by and in the interests of the hegemonic partner in the relationship. This is the *structural* problem of colonial recognition identified by Fanon in *Black Skin, White Masks*. Fanon then goes on to demonstrate how subaltern populations often develop what he called “psycho-affective”

attachments to these structurally circumscribed modes of recognition. For Fanon, these ideological attachments are essential in maintaining the economic and political structure of colonial relationships over time. This is the *subjective* dimension to the problem of colonial recognition highlighted in *Black Skin, White Masks*. With these two interrelated problematics identified, I go on to conclude the chapter with a brief discussion of an alternative politics of recognition, one that is less oriented around attaining legal and political recognition by the state, and more about Indigenous peoples empowering themselves through cultural practices of individual and collective self-fashioning that seek to *prefigure* radical alternatives to the structural and subjective dimensions of colonial power identified earlier in the chapter. I call this a *resurgent politics of recognition* and take it up in more detail in my concluding chapter.

In chapters 2, 3, and 4, I set out to empirically demonstrate the largely theoretical insights that are derived from my applied use of Fanon's critique of Hegel's master/slave narrative through three case studies drawn from the post-1969 history of Indigenous–state relations in Canada. These case studies will also serve to flesh out in more detail a number of recent debates within the liberal recognition and identity politics literature, including those that have focused on the following cluster of issues and concerns.

The Left-Materialist Challenge

The ascendant status of “identity,” “culture,” and “recognition” in contemporary political struggles has not emerged without controversy. Critics on the left, for example, have long voiced concern over what they claim to be the excessively insular and divisive character of many culture-based, identity-related movements.⁶⁵ More specifically, they argue that the inherently parochial and particularistic orientation of recognition-based politics is serving (or worse, has already served) to undermine more egalitarian and universal aspirations, like those focused on class and directed toward a more equitable distribution of socioeconomic goods. As Brian Barry explains: “Pursuit of the multiculturalist [recognition] agenda makes the achievement of broadly based egalitarian policies difficult in two ways. At a minimum it diverts political effort away from universalistic goals. But a more serious problem is that multiculturalism may very well destroy the conditions for putting together a coalition in favour of across-the-board equalisation of opportunities and resources.”⁶⁶ In such contexts it would indeed appear that “recognition struggles are serving

less to supplement, complicate and enrich redistribution struggles than to marginalize, eclipse and displace them,” as Nancy Fraser’s work suggests.⁶⁷ In short, advocates of the left-materialist critique challenge the affirmative relationship drawn between recognition and freedom by many defenders of identity/difference politics on the grounds that such a politics has proven itself incapable of transforming the generative material conditions that so often work to foreclose the realization of self-determination in the lives of ordinary citizens.

Chapter 2 interrogates the above challenge through an examination of the cultural, political, and economic dynamics that informed the Dene Nation’s struggle for national recognition and self-determination in the 1970s and early 1980s. During this period the Dene Nation was the main organization representing the political interests of the Dene peoples of the Northwest Territories, of which my own community is a part (the Yellowknives Dene First Nation). Although sensitive to certain concerns animating the left-materialist position, I argue that there is nothing intrinsic to the identity-related struggles of Indigenous peoples that predispose them to the cluster of charges noted above. To the contrary, I suggest that insofar as Indigenous cultural claims always involve demands for a more equitable distribution of land, political power, and economic resources, the left-materialist claim regarding the displacement of economic concerns by cultural ones is misplaced when applied to settler-colonial contexts.⁶⁸ However, if one takes a modified version of the displacement thesis and instead examines the relationship between Indigenous recognition claims and the distinction made by Nancy Fraser between “transformative” and “affirmative” forms of redistribution the criticism begins to hold more weight.⁶⁹ For Fraser, “transformative” models of redistribution are those that aspire to correct unjust distributions of power and resources *at their source*, whereas “affirmative” strategies, by contrast, strive to alter or modify the second-order effects of these first-order root causes. As we shall see with the example drawn from my community, the last forty years has witnessed a gradual erosion of this transformative vision within the mainstream Dene self-determination movement, which in the context of northern land claims and economic development has resulted in a partial decoupling of Indigenous “cultural” claims from the radical aspirations for social, political and economic change that once underpinned them. However, following my reading of Fanon, I argue that this gradual displacement of questions of Indigenous sovereignty and alternative

political economies by narrowly conceived cultural claims within the Dene struggle is better understood as an *effect* of primitive accumulation via the hegemonization of the liberal discourse of recognition than due to some core deficiency with Indigenous cultural politics as such.

The Essentialism Challenge

The second constellation of criticisms frequently leveled against the recognition paradigm revolves around the “essentialist” articulations of individual and collective identity that sometimes anchor demands for cultural accommodation in theory and practice. In recent feminist, queer, and antiracist literature, the term “essentialism” is often used pejoratively to refer to those theories and social practices that treat identity categories such as gender, race, and class as “fixed, immutable and universal,” instead of being constructed, contingent, and open to “cultural variation.”⁷⁰ According to Ann Philips, when recognition-based models of cultural pluralism invoke essentialist articulations of identity they risk functioning “not as a cultural liberator but as a cultural straitjacket,” forcing members of minority cultural groups “into a regime of authenticity, denying them the chance to cross cultural borders, borrow cultural influences, define and redefine themselves.”⁷¹ In order to avoid this potentially repressive feature of identity politics, we are told that the various expressions of identification and signification that underpin demands for recognition—such as “gender,” “culture,” “nationhood,” and “tradition”—must remain open-ended and never immune from contestation or democratic deliberation. The anti-essentialist position thus poses yet another set of challenges to the affirmative relationship drawn between recognition and freedom by uncritical supporters of the politics of difference.

Chapter 3 unpacks some of the problems identified by the anti-essentialist challenge through a gendered analysis of the decade of Indigenous mega-constitutional politics spanning the patriation of Canada’s Constitution Act, 1982 and the demise of the Charlottetown Accord in 1992. The Charlottetown Accord was a proposed agreement struck between the federal government, the provincial and territorial governments, and Aboriginal representatives on a proposed series of amendments to the Constitution Act, 1982. Among other things, the amendment sought to address issues concerning the recognition of Quebec’s distinct status within confederation, the recognition of an Aboriginal right to self-government, and parliamentary reform.

Although I remain indebted to the critical insights offered by Frantz Fanon and activists within the Dene Nation regarding the entangled relationship among racism, state power, capitalism, and colonial dispossession, all paid insufficient attention to the role played by patriarchy in this corrosive configuration of power. Recent feminist analyses of the ten-year effort to constitutionally entrench an Aboriginal right to self-government provide a particularly illustrative corrective to this shortcoming. Specifically, these analyses have done an excellent job foregrounding the manner in which contemporary essentialist articulations of Indigenous culture have converged with the legacy of patriarchal misrecognition under the Indian Act to discursively inform our recent efforts to attain recognition of a right to self-government. However, even though I find much of this anti-essentialist-inspired analysis compelling, I nonetheless hope to illuminate two problems that arise when this form of criticism is uncritically wielded in the context of Indigenous peoples' struggles for recognition and self-determination. First, using recent feminist and deliberative democratic critiques of Indigenous recognition politics as a backdrop, I demonstrate how normative appropriations of social constructivism can undercut the liberatory aspirations of anti-essentialist criticism by failing to adequately address the complexity of interlocking social relations that serve to exasperate the types of exclusionary cultural practices that critics of essentialism find so disconcerting. Second, and perhaps more problematically, I show that when constructivist views of culture are posited as a universal feature of social life and then used as a means to evaluate the legitimacy of Indigenous claims for cultural recognition against the uncontested authority of the colonial state, it can serve to sanction the very forms of domination and inequality that anti-essentialist criticism ought to mitigate.

Chapter 4 examines the convergence of Indigenous recognition politics with the more recent transitional justice discourse of "reconciliation" that began to gain considerable attention in Canada following the publication of the *Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples* (RCAP) in 1996. RCAP was established by the federal government in 1991 in the wake of two national crises that unraveled the previous summer and fall: the failed Meech Lake Accord and the armed standoff between the Mohawks of Kanesatake, Quebec, and the Canadian military (popularly known as the "Oka Crisis"). The commission was established with a sixteen-point mandate to investigate the troubled relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the state, and to issue a series of

comprehensive recommendations that might serve to facilitate a process of genuine “reconciliation.” The last thirty years have witnessed a global proliferation of state institutional mechanisms that promote “forgiveness” and “reconciliation” as a means of resolving the adverse social impacts of various forms of intrastate violence and historical injustice. Originally, however, this approach to conflict resolution was developed in polities undergoing a formal “transition” from the violent history of openly authoritarian regimes to more democratic forms of rule. This chapter will explore the efficacy of transitional justice mechanisms—such as state apologies, commissions of inquiry, truth and reconciliation commissions, individual reparations, and so forth—when applied to the “nontransitional” context of the Canadian settler state.

In doing so, I argue that in settler-colonial contexts such as Canada—where there is no formal period marking an explicit transition from an authoritarian past to a democratic present—state-sanctioned approaches to reconciliation tend to ideologically fabricate such a transition by narrowly situating the abuses of settler colonization firmly *in the past*. In these situations, reconciliation itself becomes temporally framed as the process of individually and collectively *overcoming* the harmful “legacy” left in the wake of this past abuse, while leaving the *present* structure of colonial rule largely unscathed. In such a context, those who refuse to forgive or reconcile are typically represented in the policy literature as suffering from this legacy, unable or unwilling to “move on” because of their simmering anger and resentment. Drawing again on Frantz Fanon’s work, I challenge the ways in which Canadian reconciliation politics tends to uncritically represent Indigenous expressions of anger and resentment as “negative” emotions that threaten to impede the realization of reconciliation in the lives of Indigenous people and communities on the one hand, and between Indigenous nations and Canada on the other. Although it is on occasion acknowledged that reactive emotions like anger and resentment can generate both positive and negative effects, more often than not defenders of reconciliation represent these emotional expressions in an unsympathetic light—as irrational, as physically and psychologically unhealthy, as reactionary, backward looking, and even as socially pathological. In contradistinction to this view, I argue that in the context of ongoing settler-colonial injustice, Indigenous peoples’ anger and resentment can indicate a sign of moral protest and political outrage that we ought to at least take seriously, if not embrace as a sign of our critical consciousness.

By the end of chapter 4 it should be evident why Fanon did not attribute much emancipatory potential to either a Hegelian or liberal politics of recognition when applied to colonial situations; this did not lead Fanon to reject the recognition paradigm entirely, however. Instead, what Fanon's work does is redirect our attention to the host of *self-affirmative* cultural practices that colonized peoples often critically engage in to *empower themselves*, as opposed to relying too heavily on the subjectifying apparatus of the state or other dominant institutions of power to do this for them. In doing so, Fanon's position challenges colonized peoples to transcend the fantasy that the settler-state apparatus—as a structure of domination *predicated* on our ongoing dispossession—is somehow capable of producing liberatory effects.⁷² The task of chapter 5 is to flesh out this self-affirmative thread in Fanon's thought and politics through a critical reading of his engagement with the work of Jean-Paul Sartre on the one hand, and the *negritude* movement on the other. Although *negritude* constituted a diverse body of inter- and postwar, francophone black artistic production and political activism, at its core the movement emphasized the need for colonized people and communities to purge themselves of the internalized effects of colonial racism through an affirmation of the worth of black difference. I argue that even though Fanon's critical appraisal of *negritude* clearly saw the revaluation of precolonial African cultural forms as a crucial means of momentarily freeing the colonized from the interpellative grasp of racist misrecognition, in the end it will be shown that he shared Sartre's unwillingness to acknowledge the transformative role that critically revived Indigenous cultural practices might play in the construction of alternatives to the colonial project of genocide and land dispossession. I thus conclude the chapter with the claim that, although insightful in many respects, Fanon's overly instrumental view of the relationship between culture and decolonization renders his theory inadequate as a framework for understanding contemporary Indigenous struggles for self-determination. Indigenous peoples tend to view their resurgent practices of cultural self-recognition and empowerment as *permanent* features of our decolonial political projects, not transitional ones.

The conclusion begins with a reiteration of the main line of argument defended in *Red Skin, White Masks*—that the liberal recognition-based approach to Indigenous self-determination in Canada that began to consolidate itself after the demise of the 1969 White Paper has not only failed, but now serves to reproduce the very forms of colonial power which our original demands for

recognition sought to transcend. This argument will undoubtedly be controversial to many Indigenous scholars and Aboriginal organization leaders insofar as it suggests that much of our efforts over the last four decades to attain settler-state recognition of our rights to land and self-government have in fact encouraged the opposite—the continued dispossession of our homelands and the ongoing usurpation of our self-determining authority. I suggest that this conclusion demands that we begin to collectively redirect our struggles *away* from a politics that seeks to attain a conciliatory form of settler-state recognition for Indigenous nations toward a *resurgent politics of recognition* premised on self-actualization, direct action, and the resurgence of cultural practices that are attentive to the subjective and structural composition of settler-colonial power. I thus conclude my investigation in *Red Skin, White Masks* with “5 theses” on Indigenous politics that highlight the core features of this resurgent approach to Indigenous decolonization in light of the Idle No More movement that exploded onto the Canadian political scene in Canada in the late fall/early winter of 2012. What originally began in the fall of 2012 as an education campaign designed to inform Canadians about a particularly repugnant and undemocratic piece of legislation recently passed by the Canadian federal government—the Jobs and Growth Act, or Bill C-45, which threatens to erode Indigenous land and treaty rights as well as environmental protections for much of our waterways—had erupted by mid-January 2013 into a full-blown defense of Indigenous land and sovereignty. Idle No More offers a productive case study through which to explore what a resurgent Indigenous politics might look like on the ground.

The Politics of Recognition in Colonial Contexts

Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare. Humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination.

—MICHEL FOUCAULT, “*Nietzsche, Genealogy, History*”

For Hegel there is reciprocity; here the master laughs at the consciousness of the slave. What he wants from the slave is not recognition but work.

—FRANTZ FANON, *Black Skin, White Masks*

My introductory chapter began by making two broad claims: first, I claimed that since 1969 we have witnessed the modus operandi of colonial power relations in Canada shift from a more or less unconcealed structure of domination to a form of colonial governance that works through the medium of state recognition and accommodation; and second, I claimed that regardless of this shift Canadian settler-colonialism remains structurally oriented around achieving the same power effect it sought in the pre-1969 period: the dispossession of Indigenous peoples of their lands and self-determining authority. This chapter further develops my first claim by providing a theoretical account of *how* the politics of recognition has come to serve the interests of colonial power in the ways that it has. It is to this question, I claim, that Fanon provides a strikingly perceptive answer: in situations where colonial rule does not depend solely on the exercise of state violence, its reproduction instead rests on the ability to entice Indigenous peoples to *identify*, either implicitly or explicitly, with the profoundly *asymmetrical* and *nonreciprocal* forms of recognition either imposed on or granted to them by the settler state and society.

Fanon first developed this insight in his 1952 text, *Black Skin, White Masks*, where he persuasively challenges the applicability of Hegel's dialectic of recognition to colonial and racialized settings.¹ In contradistinction to what he viewed as Hegel's abstraction, Fanon argued that, in *actual* contexts of domination (such as colonialism), not only are the terms of recognition usually determined by and in the interests of the master (the colonizing state and society), but also over time slave populations (the colonized) tend to develop what he called "psycho-affective" attachments to these master-sanctioned forms of recognition, and that this attachment is essential in maintaining the economic and political structure of master/slave (colonizer/colonized) relations themselves.² By the end of this chapter it should be clear in theoretical terms that the contemporary politics of recognition is ill equipped to deal with the inter-related structural and psycho-affective dimensions of colonial power that Fanon implicated in the preservation of colonial hierarchies. Once this theoretical ground has been paved, I can then proceed in chapters 2, 3, and 4 to evaluate Fanon's critique against three empirical case studies drawn from the post-1969 history of Indigenous-state relations in Canada.

This chapter is organized into four sections. In the first section, I outline some of the underlying assumptions that inform the politics of recognition from Hegel's master/slave to the work of Charles Taylor. In the second section, I apply the insights of Fanon's critique of Hegel's dialectic of recognition to highlight a number of problems that appear to plague Taylor's politics of recognition when applied to colonial contexts. Although I tend to focus most of my attention on Taylor's work, it should be clear that the conclusions reached in this chapter are by no means limited to his contribution alone. In the third section, I hope to show that the processes of colonial subjection identified in the previous sections, although formidable, are not total. As Robert Young argues, Fanon himself spent much of his career as a psychiatrist investigating "the inner effects of colonialism" in order to establish "a means through which they could be resisted, turning the inculcation of inferiority into self-empowerment."³ Here I argue that the self-affirmative logic underlying Fanon's writings on anticolonial agency and empowerment offer a potential means of evading the liberal politics of recognition's tendency to produce colonial subjects. The groundwork laid in section 3 will provide a launching point for my discussion in chapter 5 and my conclusion, where the theory and practice of Indigenous anticolonialism as a resurgent practice of cultural self-recognition will be taken

up in more detail. And finally, in the last section, I address an important counterargument to my position through a critical engagement with the work of Anishinaabe political philosopher Dale Turner.

RECOGNITION FROM HEGEL'S MASTER-SLAVE TO
CHARLES TAYLOR'S "POLITICS OF RECOGNITION"

It is now commonly acknowledged that one of Hegel's most enduring contributions to contemporary social and political thought has been his concept of "recognition." In the words of Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth: "Whether the issue is indigenous land claims or women's carework, homosexual marriage or Muslim headscarves . . . the term 'recognition' [is increasingly used] to unpack the normative bases of [today's] political claims. . . . 'Recognition' has become a key word of our time."⁴

For my purposes here it will suffice to limit my discussion of Hegel's theory of recognition to his chapter "Lordship and Bondage" in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.⁵ This narrower approach can be justified on two grounds. First, although others have recognized the importance of Hegel's earlier and later writings on recognition, Fanon was primarily concerned, following Alexander Kojève and Jean-Paul Sartre,⁶ with recognition as it appeared in the master/slave dialectic of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In this respect, it has been suggested that Fanon's work be read as an important, yet largely ignored, contribution to the so-called Hegel "renaissance" that occurred in France's intellectual scene after World War II.⁷ The second justification is that this chapter is not about Hegel per se. Rather, it concerns the contemporary appropriation (whether implicit or explicit) of his theory of recognition by activists, political theorists, and policy makers working on issues pertaining to Indigenous self-determination in Canada. Only once I have teased out the logic of recognition at play in Hegel's master/slave narrative, can I begin to unpack and problematize this appropriation.

As suggested in the previous chapter, at its core, Hegel's master/slave narrative can be read in at least two ways that continue to inform contemporary recognition-based theories of liberal pluralism. On the first reading, Hegel's dialectic outlines a theory of identity formation that cuts against the classical liberal view of the subject insofar as it situates social relations at the fore of human subjectivity. On this account, relations of recognition are deemed "constitutive of subjectivity: one becomes an individual subject only in virtue of

recognizing, and being recognized by another subject.”⁸ Our senses of self are thus dependent on and shaped through our complex relations with others. This insight into the intersubjective nature of identity formation underlies Hegel’s often quoted assertion that “self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.”⁹

On the second reading, the dialectic moves beyond highlighting the relational nature of human subjectivity to elucidate what Hegel sees as the intersubjective conditions required for the *realization of human freedom*. From this perspective, the master/slave narrative can be read in a normative light in that it suggests that the realization of oneself as an essential, self-determining agent requires that one not only be recognized as self-determining, but that one be recognized by another self-consciousness that is also recognized as self-determining. It is through these reciprocal processes and exchanges of recognition that the condition of possibility for freedom emerges.¹⁰ Hence Hegel’s repeated insistence that relations of recognition be *mutual*. This point is driven home in the latter half of Hegel’s section “Lordship and Bondage,” when he discusses the ironic fate of the master in a context of asymmetrical recognition. After the “life-and-death struggle” between the two self-consciousnesses temporarily cashes out in the hierarchical master/slave relationship, Hegel goes on to depict a surprising turn of events in which the *master’s* desire for recognition as an essential “being-for-itself” is thwarted by the fact that he or she is only recognized by the unessential and dependent consciousness of the slave,¹¹ and of course recognition by a slave hardly constitutes recognition at all. In this “onesided and unequal” relationship the master fails to gain certainty of “being-for-self as the truth of himself. On the contrary, his truth is in reality the unessential consciousness and its unessential action.”¹² Meanwhile, as the master continues to wallow in his sluggish state of increased dependency, the slave, through his or her transformative labor, “becomes conscious of what he truly is” and “*qua* worker” comes to realize “his own independence.”¹³ Thus, in the end, the truth of independent consciousness and one’s status as a self-determining actor is realized more through the praxis of the slave—through his or her transformative work in and on the world. However, here it is important to note that for Hegel, “the revolution of the slave is not simply to replace the master while maintaining the unequal hierarchical recognition.” This, of course, would only temporarily invert the relation, and the slave would

eventually meet the same fate as the master. Rather, as Robert Williams reminds us, Hegel's project was to move "beyond the patterns of domination [and] inequality" that typify asymmetrical relations of recognition as such.¹⁴ It is also on this point that many contemporary theorists of recognition remain committed.

In *Bound by Recognition*, Patchen Markell suggests that one of the most significant differences between recognition in Hegel's master/slave and the "politics of recognition" today is that state institutions tend to play a fundamental role in mediating relations of recognition in the latter, but not the former.¹⁵ For example, regarding policies aimed at preserving cultural diversity, Markell writes: "far from being simple face-to-face encounters between subjects, à la Hegel's stylized story in the *Phenomenology*," multiculturalism tends to "involve large-scale exchanges of recognition in which states typically play a crucial role."¹⁶ Charles Taylor's "The Politics of Recognition" provides a particularly salient example of this. In this essay, Taylor draws on the insights of Hegel, among others, to mount a sustained critique of what he claims to be the increasingly "impracticable" nature of "difference-blind" liberalism when applied to culturally diverse polities such as the United States and Canada.¹⁷ Alternatively, Taylor defends a variant of liberal thought that posits that, under certain circumstances, diverse states can indeed recognize and accommodate a range of group-specific claims without having to abandon their commitment to a core set of fundamental rights.¹⁸ Furthermore, these types of claims can be defended on liberal grounds because it is within and against the horizon of one's cultural community that individuals come to develop their identities, and thus the capacity to make sense of their lives and life choices. In short, our identities provide the "background against which our tastes and desires and opinions and aspirations make sense. Without this orienting framework we would be unable to derive meaning from our lives—we would not know "who we are" or "where [we are] coming from." We would be "at sea," as Taylor puts it elsewhere.¹⁹

Thus, much like Hegel before him, Taylor argues that human actors do not develop their identities in "isolation," rather they are "formed" through "dialogue with others, in agreement or struggle with their recognition of us."²⁰ However, given that our identities are formed through these relations, it also follows that they can be significantly *deformed* when these processes go awry. This is what Taylor means when he asserts that identities are shaped not only

by recognition, but also its *absence*, “often by the *misrecognition* of others. A person or a group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning one in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.”²¹ This idea that asymmetrical relations of recognition can impede human freedom by “imprisoning” someone in a distorted relation-to-self is asserted repeatedly in Taylor’s essay. For instance, we are frequently told that disparaging forms of recognition can inflict “wounds” on their “victims,” “saddling [them] with a crippling self-hatred”; or that withholding recognition can “inflict damage” on “those who are denied it.”²² And given that misrecognition has the capacity to “harm” others in this manner, it follows, according to Taylor, that it be considered “a form of oppression” on par with “injustices” such as “inequality” and “exploitation.”²³ In Taylor, recognition is elevated to the status of a “vital human need.”²⁴

At this point the practical implications of Taylor’s theory begin to reveal themselves. In his more prescriptive moments, Taylor suggests that, in Canada, both the Quebecois and Indigenous peoples exemplify the types of threatened minorities that ought to be considered eligible for some form of recognition capable of accommodating their cultural distinctiveness. For Indigenous peoples specifically, this might require the delegation of political and cultural “autonomy” to Native groups through the institutions of “self-government.”²⁵ Elsewhere, Taylor suggests that this could mean “in practice allowing for a new form of jurisdiction in Canada, perhaps weaker than the provinces, but, unlike municipalities.”²⁶ Accommodating the claims of First Nations in this way would ideally allow Native communities to “preserve their cultural integrity” and thus help stave off the psychological disorientation and resultant unfreedom associated with exposure to structured patterns of mis- or nonrecognition.²⁷ In this way, the institutionalization of a liberal regime of reciprocal recognition would better enable Indigenous peoples to realize their status as distinct and self-determining actors.

Although it is true that the normative dimension of Taylor’s project represents an improvement over Canada’s “past tactics of exclusion, genocide, and assimilation,” in the following section I argue that the logic informing this dimension—where “recognition” is conceived as something that is ultimately “granted” or “accorded” a subaltern group or entity by a dominant group or

entity—prefigures its failure to significantly modify, let alone transcend, the breadth of power at play in colonial relationships.²⁸ I also hope to show that Fanon, whose work Taylor relies on to delineate the relationship between misrecognition and the forms of unfreedom and subjection discussed above, anticipated this failure over fifty years ago.

FRANTZ FANON'S "SOCIODIAGNOSTIC" CRITIQUE OF RECOGNITION POLITICS

In the second half of "The Politics of Recognition" Taylor identifies Fanon's classic *The Wretched of the Earth* as one of the first texts to elicit the role that misrecognition plays in propping up relations of domination.²⁹ By extension Fanon's analysis in *The Wretched of the Earth* is also used to support one of the central political arguments underlying Taylor's analysis, namely, his call for the cultural recognition of sub-state groups that have suffered at the hands of a hegemonic political power. Although Taylor acknowledges that Fanon advocated "violent" struggle as the primary means of overcoming the "psycho-existential" complexes instilled in colonial subjects by misrecognition, he nonetheless insists that Fanon's argument is applicable to contemporary debates surrounding the "politics of difference" more generally.³⁰ Below I want to challenge Taylor's use of Fanon in this context: not by disputing Taylor's assertion that Fanon's work constitutes an important theorization of the ways in which the subjectivities of the oppressed can be deformed by mis- or nonrecognition, but rather by contesting his assumption that a more accommodating, liberal regime of mutual recognition might be capable of addressing the power relations typical of those between Indigenous peoples and settler states. Interestingly, Fanon posed a similar challenge in his earlier work, *Black Skin, White Masks*.

Fanon's concern with the relationship between human freedom and equality in relations of recognition represents a central and reoccurring theme in *Black Skin, White Masks*.³¹ As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, it was there that Fanon convincingly argued that the long-term stability of a colonial system of governance relies as much on the "internalization" of the forms of racist recognition imposed or bestowed on the Indigenous population by the colonial state and society as it does on brute force. For Fanon, then, the longevity of a colonial social formation depends, to a significant degree, on its capacity to transform the colonized population into *subjects* of imperial rule.

Here Fanon anticipates at least one aspect of the well-known work of French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser, who would later argue that the reproduction of capitalist relations of production rests on the “recognition function” of ideology, namely, the ability of a state’s “ideological apparatus” to “interpellate” individuals as subjects of class rule.³² For Fanon, colonialism operates in a similarly dual-structured manner: it includes “not only the interrelations of *objective* historical conditions but also human *attitudes* to these conditions.”³³ Fanon argued that it was the interplay between the structural/objective and recognitive/subjective features of colonialism that ensured its hegemony over time.

With respect to the subjective dimension, *Black Skin, White Masks* painstakingly outlines the myriad ways in which those “attitudes” conducive to colonial rule are cultivated among the colonized through the unequal exchange of institutionalized and interpersonal patterns of recognition between the colonial society and the Indigenous population. In effect, Fanon showed how, over time, colonized populations tend to internalize the derogatory images imposed on them by their colonial “masters,” and how as a result of this process, these images, along with the structural relations with which they are entwined, come to be recognized (or at least endured) as more or less natural.³⁴ This point is made agonizingly clear in arguably the most famous passage from *Black Skin, White Masks* where Fanon shares an alienating encounter on the streets of Paris with a little white child. “Look, a Negro!” Fanon recalled the child saying, “Moma, see the Negro! I’m frightened! frightened!”³⁵ At that moment the imposition of the child’s racist gaze “sealed” Fanon into a “crushing objecthood,” fixing him like “a chemical solution is fixed by a dye.”³⁶ He found himself temporarily *accepting* that he was indeed the subject of the child’s call: “It was true, it amused me,” thought Fanon.³⁷ But then “I subjected myself to an objective examination, I discovered my blackness, my ethnic characteristics; and I was battered down by tom-toms, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetishism, racial defects.”³⁸ Far from assuring Fanon’s humanity, the other’s recognition imprisoned him in an externally determined and devalued conception of himself. Instead of being acknowledged as a “man among men,” he was reduced to “an object [among] other objects.”³⁹

Left as is, Fanon’s insights into the ultimately subjectifying nature of colonial recognition appear to square nicely with Taylor’s work. For example, although Fanon never uses the term himself, he appears to be mapping the debilitating

effects associated with *mis*recognition in the sense that Taylor uses the term. Indeed, *Black Skin, White Masks* is littered with passages highlighting the innumerable ways in which the imposition of the settler's gaze can inflict damage on Indigenous societies at both the individual and collective levels. Taylor is more or less explicit about his debt to Fanon in this respect too. "Since 1492," he writes with *The Wretched of the Earth* in mind, "Europeans have projected an image of [the colonized] as somehow inferior, 'uncivilized,' and through the force of conquest have been able to impose this image on the conquered."⁴⁰ Even with these similarities, however, I believe that a close reading of *Black Skin, White Masks* renders problematic Taylor's approach in several interrelated and crucial respects.

The first problem has to do with its failure to adequately confront the dual structure of colonialism itself. Fanon insisted, for example, that a colonial configuration of power could be transformed only if attacked at both levels of operation: the objective and the subjective.⁴¹ This point is made at the outset of *Black Skin, White Masks* and reverberates throughout all of Fanon's work. As indicated in his introduction, although a significant amount of *Black Skin, White Masks* would highlight and explore the "psychological" terrain of colonialism, this would not be done in a manner decoupled from an analysis of its structural or material foundations. Indeed, Fanon claimed that there "will be an authentic disalienation" of the colonized subject "only to the degree to which things, in the most materialistic meaning of the word, [are] returned to their proper places."⁴² Hence the term "sociodiagnostic" for Fanon's project: "If there is an inferiority complex, it is the outcome of a double process . . . primarily economic; [and] subsequently the internalization . . . of his inferiority."⁴³ In Fanon, colonial-capitalist exploitation and domination is correctly situated alongside *mis*recognition and alienation as foundational sources of colonial injustice. "The Negro problem," writes Fanon, "does not resolve itself into the problem of Negroes living among white men but rather of Negroes being exploited, enslaved, despised by a colonialist, capitalist society that is only accidentally white."⁴⁴

Fanon was enough of a Marxist to understand the role played by capitalism in exasperating hierarchical relations of recognition. However, he was also much more perceptive than many Marxists of his day in his insistence that the subjective realm of colonialism be the target of strategic transformation along with the socioeconomic structure. The colonized person "must wage war on

both levels,” insisted Fanon. “Since historically they influence each other, any unilateral liberation is incomplete, and the gravest mistake would be to believe in their automatic interdependence.”⁴⁵ For Fanon, attacking colonial power on one front, in other words, would not guarantee the subversion of its effects on the other. “This is why a Marxist analysis should always be slightly stretched when it comes to addressing the colonial issue,” Fanon would later write in *The Wretched of the Earth*.⁴⁶ Here, I would argue that Fanon’s “stretching” of the Marxist paradigm constitutes one of the most innovative contributions to classical Marxist debates on ideology. Unlike the position of, say, Georg Lukacs, who boldly claimed in *History and Class Consciousness* that there is “no problem” and therefore “no solution” that does not ultimately lead back to the question of economic structure,⁴⁷ Fanon revealed the ways in which those axes of domination historically relegated in Marxism to the superstructural realm—such as racism and the effects it has on those subject to it—could substantively configure the character of social relations relatively autonomously from capitalist economics.

Lately a number of scholars have taken aim at the contribution of recognition theorists like Taylor on analogous grounds: that their work offers little insight into how to address the more overtly structural and/or economic features of social oppression.⁴⁸ We have also been told that this lack of insight has contributed to a shift in the terrain of contemporary political thought and practice more generally—from “redistribution to recognition,” to use Nancy Fraser’s formulation. According to Fraser, whereas proponents of redistribution tend to highlight and confront injustices in the economic sphere, advocates of the newer “politics of recognition” tend to focus on and attack injustices in the cultural realm. On the redistribution front, proposed remedies for injustice range between “affirmative” strategies, like the administration of welfare, to more “transformative” methods, like the transformation of the capitalist mode of production itself. In contrast, strategies aimed at injustices associated with misrecognition tend to focus on “cultural and symbolic change.” Again, this could involve “affirmative” approaches, such as the recognition and reaffirmation of previously disparaged identities, or these strategies could adopt a more “transformative” form, such as the “deconstruction” of dominant “patterns of representation” in ways that would “change everyone’s social identities.”⁴⁹

I think that Fanon’s work, which anticipates the recognition/redistribution debate by half a century, highlights several key shortcomings in the approaches

of both Taylor and Fraser. Taylor's approach is insufficient insofar as it tends to, at its best, address the political economy of colonialism in a strictly "affirmative" manner: through reformist state redistribution schemes like granting certain cultural rights and concessions to Aboriginal communities via self-government and land claims packages. Although this approach may alter the intensity of some of the effects of colonial-capitalist exploitation and domination, it does little to address their generative structures, in this case a capitalist economy constituted by racial and gender hierarchies and the colonial state. When his work is at its weakest, however, Taylor tends to focus on the recognition end of the spectrum too much, and as a result leaves uninterrogated colonialism's deep-seated structural features. Richard J. F. Day has succinctly framed the problem this way: "Although Taylor's recognition model allows for diversity of culture within a particular state by admitting the possibility of multiple national identifications," it is less "permissive with regard to polity and economy . . . in assuming that any subaltern group that is granted [recognition] will thereby acquire a *subordinate* articulation with a *capitalist state*."⁵⁰ Seen from this angle, Taylor's theory leaves one of the two operative levels of colonial power identified by Fanon untouched.

This line of criticism is well worn and can be traced back to at least the work of early Karl Marx. As such, I doubt that many would be surprised that Taylor's variant of liberalism *as liberalism* fails to confront the structural or economic aspects of colonialism at its generative roots. To my mind, however, this shortcoming in Taylor's approach is particularly surprising given the fact that, although many Indigenous leaders and communities today tend to instrumentally couch their claims in reformist terms, this has not always been the case: indeed, historically, Indigenous demands for *cultural recognition* have often been expressed in ways that have explicitly called into question the dominating nature of capitalist social relations and the state form.⁵¹ And the same can be said of a growing number of today's most prominent Indigenous scholars and activists.⁵² Mohawk political scientist Taiaiake Alfred, for example, has repeatedly argued that the goal of any traditionally rooted self-determination struggle ought to be to protect that which constitutes the "heart and soul of [I]ndigenous nations: a set of values that challenge the homogenizing force of Western liberalism and free-market capitalism; that honor the autonomy of individual conscience, non-coercive authority, and the deep interconnection between human beings and other elements of creation."⁵³ For Alfred, this

vision is not only embodied in the practical philosophies and ethical systems of many of North America's Indigenous societies, but also flows from a "realization that capitalist economics and liberal delusions of progress" have historically served as the "engines of colonial aggression and injustice" itself.⁵⁴ My point here is that an approach that is explicitly oriented around dialog and listening ought to be more sensitive to the claims and challenges emanating from these dissenting Indigenous voices.⁵⁵

However, if Taylor's account pays insufficient attention to the clearly structural and economic realm of domination, then Fraser's does so from the opposite angle. In order to avoid what she sees as the pitfalls associated with the politics of recognition's latent essentialism and displacement of questions of distributive justice, Fraser proposes a means of integrating struggles for recognition with those of redistribution without subordinating one to the other. To this end, Fraser suggests that instead of understanding recognition as the revaluation of cultural or group-specific identity, and misrecognition as the disparagement of such identity and its consequent effects on the subjectivities of minorities, recognition and misrecognition should be conceived of in terms of the "institutionalized patterns of value" that affect one's ability to participate *as a peer* in social life. "To view recognition" in this manner, writes Fraser, "is to treat it as an issue of *social status*."⁵⁶

Although Fraser's status model allows her to curtail some of the problems she attributes to identity politics, it does so at the expense of addressing two of the most pertinent features of injustices related to mis- or nonrecognition in colonial contexts. First, when applied to Indigenous struggles for recognition, Fraser's status model rests on the problematic background assumption that the settler state constitutes a legitimate framework within which Indigenous peoples might be more justly included, or from which they could be further excluded. Here Fraser, like Taylor, leaves intact two features of colonial domination that Indigenous assertions of nationhood call into question: the legitimacy of the settler state's claim to sovereignty over Indigenous people and their territories on the one hand, and the normative status of the state-form as an appropriate mode of governance on the other.⁵⁷ Indeed, at one point in her well-known exchange with Axel Honneth, Fraser hints at her theory's weakness in this regard. While discussing the work of Will Kymlicka, Fraser admits that her status model may not be as suited to situations where claims for recognition contest a current distribution of state sovereignty. Where

Kymlicka's approach is tailored to demands for recognition in multinational societies, Fraser's project, we are told, seeks to address such demands in "poly-ethnic" polities like the United States.⁵⁸ The problem with this caveat, however, is that it is premised on a misrecognition of its own: namely, that as a state founded on the dispossessed territories of previously self-determining but now colonized Indigenous nations, the United States is a multinational state in much the way that Canada is. My second concern is this: if many of today's most volatile political conflicts *do* include subjective or psychological dimensions to them in the way that Fraser admits (and Taylor and Fanon describe), then I fear her approach, which attempts to eschew a direct engagement with this aspect of social oppression, risks leaving an important contributing dynamic to identity-related forms of domination unchecked. By avoiding this "psychologizing" tendency within the politics of recognition, Fraser claims to have located what is wrong with misrecognition in "social relations" and not "individual or interpersonal psychology." This is preferable, we are told, because when misrecognition "is identified with internal distortions in the structure of the consciousness of the oppressed, it is but a short step to blaming the victim."⁵⁹ This does not have to be the case. Fanon, for example, was unambiguous with respect to locating the cause of the "inferiority complex" of colonized subjects in the colonial social structure.⁶⁰ The problem, however, is that any psychological problems that ensue, although socially constituted, can take on a life of their own, and thus need to be dealt with independently and in accordance with their own specific logics. As mentioned previously, Fanon was insistent that a change in the social structure would not guarantee a change in the subjectivities of the oppressed. Stated simply, if Fanon's insight into the interdependent yet semi-autonomous nature of the two facets of colonial power is correct, then dumping all our efforts into alleviating the institutional or structural impediments to participatory parity (whether redistributive or recognitive) may not do anything to undercut the debilitating forms of unfreedom related to misrecognition in the traditional sense.⁶¹

This brings us to the second key problem with Taylor's theory when applied to colonial contexts. I have already suggested that Taylor's liberal-recognition approach is incapable of curbing the damages wrought within and against Indigenous communities by the structures of state and capital, but what about his theory of recognition? Does it suffer the same fate vis-à-vis the

forms of power that it seeks to undercut? As noted in the previous section, underlying Taylor's theory is the assumption that the flourishing of Indigenous peoples as distinct and self-determining entities is significantly dependent on their being afforded cultural recognition and institutional accommodation by the settler state apparatus. What makes this approach both so intriguing and so problematic, however, is that Fanon, whom Taylor uses to make his case, argued against a similar presumption in the penultimate chapter of *Black Skin, White Masks*. Moreover, like Taylor, Fanon did so with reference to Hegel's master/slave parable. There Fanon argued that the dialectical progression to reciprocity in relations of recognition is frequently undermined in colonial situations by the fact that, unlike the subjugated slave in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, many colonized societies no longer have to *struggle* for their freedom and independence. It is often negotiated, achieved through constitutional amendment, or simply "declared" by the settler state and bestowed upon the Indigenous population in the form of political rights. Whatever the method, in these circumstances the colonized, "steeped in the inessentiality of servitude," are "set free by [the] master."⁶² "One day the White Master, *without conflict*, recognize[s] the Negro slave."⁶³ As such, they do not have to lay down their lives to *prove* their "certainty of being" in the way that Hegel insisted.⁶⁴ The "upheaval" of formal freedom and independence thus reaches the colonized "from without": "The black man [is] acted upon. Values that [are] not . . . created by his actions, values that [are] not . . . born of the systolic tide of his blood, [dance] in a hued whirl around him. The upheaval [does] not make a difference in the Negro. He [goes] from *one way of life to another*, but not from one life to another."⁶⁵ There are a number of important issues underlying Fanon's concern here. The first involves the relationship he draws between struggle and the disalienation of the colonized subject. For Fanon it is through struggle and conflict (and for the later Fanon, *violent* struggle and conflict) that imperial subjects come to be rid of the "arsenal of complexes" driven into the core of their being through the colonial process.⁶⁶ I will have more to say about this aspect of Fanon's thought below, but for now I simply want to flag the fact that struggle serves as the mediating force through which the colonized come to shed their colonial identities, thus restoring them to their "proper places."⁶⁷ In contexts where recognition is conferred without struggle or conflict, this fundamental self-transformation—or as Lou Turner has put it, this "inner differentiation" at the level of the colonized's being—cannot

occur, thus foreclosing the realization of freedom. Hence Fanon's claim that the colonized simply go from "one way of life to another, but not from one life to another"; the structure of domination is modified, but the subject position of the colonized remains unchanged—they become "emancipated slaves."⁶⁸

The second important point to note is that when Fanon speaks of a lack of struggle in the decolonization movements of his day, he does not mean to suggest that the colonized in these contexts simply remained passive recipients of colonial practices. He readily admits, for example, that "from time to time" the colonized may indeed fight "for Liberty and Justice." However, when this fight is carried out in a manner that does not pose a foundational "break" with the background structures of colonial power as such—which, for Fanon, will always invoke struggle and conflict—then the best the colonized can hope for is "white liberty and white justice; that is, values secreted by [their] masters."⁶⁹ Without conflict and struggle the terms of recognition tend to remain in the possession of those in power to bestow on their inferiors in ways that they deem appropriate.⁷⁰ Note the double level of subjection here: without transformative struggle constituting an integral aspect of anticolonial praxis the Indigenous population will not only remain subjects of imperial rule insofar as they have not gone through a process of purging the psycho-existential complexes battered into them over the course of their colonial experience—a process of strategic *desubjectification*—but they will also remain so in that the Indigenous society will tend to come to see the forms of structurally limited and constrained recognition conferred to them by their colonial "masters" as *their own*: that is, the colonized will begin to *identify* with "white liberty and white justice." As Fanon would later phrase it in *The Wretched of the Earth*, these values eventually "seep" into the colonized and subtly structure and limit the possibility of their freedom.⁷¹ Either way, for Fanon, the colonized will have failed to reestablish themselves as truly self-determining: as creators of the terms, values, and conditions by which they are to be recognized.⁷²

My third concern with Taylor's politics of recognition involves a misguided sociological assumption that undergirds his appropriation of Hegel's notion of mutual recognition. As noted in the previous section, at the heart of Hegel's master/slave dialectic is the idea that both parties engaged in the struggle for recognition are dependent on the other's acknowledgment for their freedom and self-worth. Moreover, Hegel asserts that this dependency is even more crucial for the master in the relationship, for unlike the slave he or she is unable

to achieve independence and objective self-certainty through the object of his or her own labor. Mutual dependency thus appears to be the background condition that ensures the dialectic progress towards reciprocity. This is why Taylor claims, with reference to Hegel, that “the struggle for recognition can only find *one satisfactory solution, and that is a regime of reciprocal recognition among equals.*”⁷³ However, as Fanon’s work reminds us, the problem with this formulation is that when applied to actual struggles for recognition between hegemonic and subaltern communities the mutual character of dependency rarely exists. This observation is made in a lengthy footnote in *Black Skin, White Masks* where Fanon claims to have shown how the colonial master “basically differs” from the master depicted in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*. “For Hegel there is reciprocity,” but in the colonies “the master laughs at the consciousness of the slave. What he wants from the slave is *not recognition but work.*”⁷⁴ To my mind this is one of the most crucial passages in *Black Skin, White Masks* for it outlines in precise terms what is wrong with the recognition paradigm when abstracted from the face-to-face encounter in Hegel’s dialectic and applied to colonial situations. Although the issue here is an obvious one, it has nonetheless been critically overlooked in the contemporary recognition literature: in relations of domination that exist between nation-states and the sub-state national groups that they “incorporate” into their territorial and jurisdictional boundaries, there is no mutual dependency in terms of a need or desire for recognition.⁷⁵ In these contexts, the “master”—that is, the colonial state and state society—does not require recognition from the previously self-determining communities upon which its territorial, economic, and social infrastructure is constituted. What it needs is land, labor, and resources.⁷⁶ Thus, rather than leading to a condition of reciprocity the dialectic either breaks down with the explicit *non*recognition of the equal status of the colonized population, or with the strategic “domestication” of the terms of recognition leaving the foundation of the colonial relationship relatively undisturbed.⁷⁷

Anyone familiar with the power dynamics that structure the Aboriginal rights movement in Canada should immediately see the applicability of Fanon’s insights here. Indeed, one need not expend much effort to elicit the countless ways in which the liberal discourse of recognition has been limited and constrained by the state, the courts, corporate interests, and policy makers in ways that have helped preserve the colonial status quo. With respect to the law, for

example, over the last thirty years the Supreme Court of Canada has consistently refused to recognize Aboriginal peoples' equal and self-determining status based on its adherence to legal precedent founded on the white supremacist myth that Indigenous societies were too primitive to bear political rights when they first encountered European powers.⁷⁸ Thus, even though the courts have secured an unprecedented degree of protection for certain "cultural" practices within the state, they have nonetheless repeatedly refused to challenge the racist origin of Canada's assumed sovereign authority over Indigenous peoples and their territories.

The political and economic ramifications of recent Aboriginal rights jurisprudence have been clear-cut. In *Delgamuukw v. British Columbia* it was declared that any residual Aboriginal rights that may have survived the unilateral assertion of Crown sovereignty could be infringed upon by the federal and provincial governments so long as this action could be shown to further "a compelling and substantial legislative objective" that is "consistent with the special fiduciary relationship between the Crown and the [A]boriginal peoples." What substantial objectives might justify infringement? According to the court, virtually any exploitative economic venture, including the "development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power, the general economic development of the interior of British Columbia, protection of the environment or endangered species, and the building of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign populations to support those aims."⁷⁹ So today it appears, much as it did in Fanon's day, that colonial powers will only recognize the collective rights and identities of Indigenous peoples insofar as this recognition does not throw into question the background legal, political, and economic framework of the colonial relationship itself.⁸⁰

But the above examples confirm only one aspect of Fanon's insight into the problem of recognition in colonial contexts: namely, the limitations this approach runs up against when pitted against these overtly structural expressions of domination. Are his criticisms and concerns equally relevant to the subjective or psycho-affective features of contemporary colonial power?

With respect to the forms of racist recognition driven into the psyches of Indigenous peoples through the institutions of the state, church, schools, and media, and by racist individuals within the dominant society, the answer is clearly yes. Countless studies, novels, and autobiographical narratives have outlined, in painful detail, how these expressions have saddled individuals

with low self-esteem, depression, alcohol and drug abuse, and violent behaviors directed both inward against the self and outward toward others.⁸¹

Similarly convincing arguments have been made concerning the limited forms of recognition and accommodation offered to Indigenous communities by the state. For example, Taiaiake Alfred's work unpacks the ways in which the state institutional and discursive fields within and against which Indigenous demands for recognition are made and adjudicated can come to shape the self-understandings of the Indigenous claimants involved. The problem for Alfred is that these fields are by no means neutral: they are profoundly hierarchical and as such have the ability to asymmetrically govern how Indigenous subjects think and act not only in relation to the recognition claim at hand, but also in relation to themselves, to others, and the land. This is what I take Alfred to mean when he suggests, echoing Fanon, that the dominance of the legal approach to self-determination has over time helped produce a class of Aboriginal "citizens" whose rights and identities have become defined more in relation to the colonial state and its legal apparatus than the history and traditions of Indigenous nations themselves. Similarly, strategies that have sought independence via capitalist economic development have already facilitated the creation of an emergent Aboriginal bourgeoisie whose thirst for profit has come to outweigh their ancestral obligations to the land and to others. Whatever the method, the point here is that these strategies threaten to erode the most egalitarian, nonauthoritarian, and sustainable characteristics of traditional Indigenous cultural practices and forms of social organization.⁸²

SELF-RECOGNITION AND ANTICOLONIAL EMPOWERMENT

The argument sketched to this point is bleak in its implications. Indeed, left as is, it would appear that recognition inevitably leads to subjection, and as such much of what Indigenous peoples have sought over the last forty years to secure their freedom has in practice cunningly assured its opposite. Interpreted this way, my line of argument appears to adhere to an outdated conception of power, one in which postcolonial critics, often reacting against the likes of Fanon and others, have worked so diligently to refute. The implication of this view is that Indigenous subjects are *always* being interpellated by recognition, being constructed by colonial discourse, or being assimilated by colonial power structures.⁸³ As a result, resistance to this totalizing power is often portrayed as an inherently reactionary, zero-sum project. To the degree that

Fanon can be implicated in espousing such a totalizing view of colonial power, it has been suggested that he was unable to escape the Manichean logic so essential in propping up relations of colonial domination to begin with.⁸⁴

I want to defend Fanon, at least partially, from the charge that he advocated such a devastating view of power. However, in order to assess the degree to which Fanon anticipates and accounts for this general line of criticism, we must unpack his theory of anticolonial agency and empowerment.

As argued throughout the preceding pages, Fanon did not attribute much emancipatory potential to Hegel's politics of recognition when applied to colonial situations. Yet this is not to say that he rejected the recognition paradigm entirely. As we have seen, like Hegel and Taylor, Fanon ascribed to the notion that relations of recognition are constitutive of subjectivity and that, when unequal, they can foreclose the realization of human freedom. On the latter point, however, he was deeply skeptical as to whether the mutuality envisioned by Hegel was achievable in the conditions indicative of contemporary colonialism. But if Fanon did not see freedom as naturally emanating from the slave being granted recognition from his or her master, where, if at all, did it originate?⁸⁵

In effect, Fanon claimed that the pathway to self-determination instead lay in a quasi-Nietzschean form of personal and collective *self-affirmation*.⁸⁶ Rather than remaining dependent on their oppressors for their freedom and self-worth, Fanon recognized that the colonized must instead struggle to work through their alienation/subjectation against the objectifying gaze and assimilative lure of colonial recognition. According to Fanon, it is this self-initiated process that "triggers a change of fundamental importance in the colonized's psycho-affective equilibrium."⁸⁷ According to this view, the colonized must initiate the process of decolonization by first recognizing *themselves* as free, dignified, and distinct contributors to humanity. Unlike Nietzsche, however, Fanon equated this process of *self-recognition* with the praxis undertaken by the slave in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which Fanon saw as illustrating the necessity on the part of the oppressed to "turn away" from their other-oriented master-dependency, and to instead struggle for freedom on their own terms and in accordance with their own values.⁸⁸ I would also argue that this is why Fanon, although critical of the at times bourgeois and essentialist character of certain works within the *negritude* tradition, nonetheless saw the project as necessary.⁸⁹ Fanon was attuned to ways in which the individual and collective reevaluation of black culture and identity could serve as a source of

pride and empowerment, and if approached critically and directed appropriately, could help jolt the colonized into an “actional” existence, as opposed to a “reactional” one characterized by *ressentiment*.⁹⁰ As Robert Young notes in the context of Third World decolonization, it was this initial process of collective self-affirmation that led many colonized populations to develop a “distinctive postcolonial epistemology and ontology” which enabled them to begin to conceive of and construct alternatives to the colonial project itself.⁹¹

I would argue that Fanon’s call in *Black Skin, White Masks* for a simultaneous turn inward and away from the master, far from espousing a rigidly binaristic Manichean view of power relations, instead reflects a profound understanding of the complexity involved in contests over recognition in colonial and racialized environments. Unlike Hegel’s life-and-death struggle between two opposing forces, Fanon added a multidimensional racial/cultural aspect to the dialectic, thereby underscoring the multifarious web of recognition relations that are at work in constructing identities and establishing (or undermining) the conditions necessary for human freedom and flourishing. Fanon showed that the power dynamics in which identities are formed and deformed were nothing like the hegemon/subaltern binary depicted by Hegel. In an anticipatory way, then, Fanon’s insight can also be said to challenge the overly negative and all-subjectifying view of interpellation that would plague Althusser’s theory of ideology more than a decade later. For Althusser, the process of interpellation always took the form of “a fundamental misrecognition” that served to produce within individuals the “specific characteristics and desires that commit them to the very actions that are required of them by their [subordinate] class position.”⁹² Fanon’s innovation was that he showed how similar recognitive processes worked to “call forth” and empower individuals within communities of resistance.⁹³

This is not to say, of course, that Fanon was able to completely escape the “Manicheism delirium” that he was so astute at diagnosing.⁹⁴ Those familiar with the legacy of Fanon’s later work, for example, know that the “actional” existence that he saw self-recognition initiating in *Black Skin, White Masks* would in *The Wretched of the Earth* take the form of a direct and violent engagement with the colonial society and its institutional structure. “At the very moment [the colonized come to] discover their humanity,” wrote Fanon, they must “begin to sharpen their weapons to secure its victory.”⁹⁵ In Fanon’s later work, violence would come to serve as a “kind of psychotherapy of the

oppressed,” offering “a primary form of agency through which the subject moves from non-being to being, from object to subject.”⁹⁶ In this sense, the practice of revolutionary violence, rather than the affirmative recognition of the other, offered the most effective means to transform the subjectivities of the colonized, as well as to topple the social structure that produced colonized subjects to begin with.

TURNING OUR BACKS ON COLONIAL POWER?

Before concluding this chapter, I want to briefly address an important counterargument to the position I am advocating here, especially regarding the call to selectively “turn away” from engaging the discourses and structures of settler-colonial power with the aim of transforming these sites from within. Dale Turner offers such an argument in his book *This Is Not a Peace Pipe: Towards a Critical Indigenous Philosophy*, in which he advances the claim that if Indigenous peoples want the relationship between themselves and the Canadian state to be informed by their distinct worldviews, then “they will have to engage the state’s legal and political discourses in more effective ways.”⁹⁷ Underlying Turner’s theoretical intervention is the assumption that colonial relations of power operate primarily by *excluding* the perspectives of Indigenous peoples from the discursive and institutional sites that give their rights content. Assuming this is true, then it would indeed appear that “critically undermining colonialism” requires that Indigenous peoples find more effective ways of “participating in the Canadian legal and political practices that determine the meaning of Aboriginal rights.”⁹⁸

For Turner, one of the preconditions for establishing a “postcolonial” relationship is the development of an intellectual community of Indigenous “word warriors” capable of engaging the legal and political discourses of the state. According to Turner, because it is an unfortunate but unavoidable fact that the rights of Indigenous peoples will for the foreseeable future be largely interpreted by non-Indigenous judges and policy makers within non-Indigenous institutions, it is imperative that Indigenous communities develop the capacity to effectively *interject* our unique perspectives into the conceptual spaces where our rights are framed. It is on this last point that Turner claims to distinguish his approach from the work of Indigenous intellectuals like Patricia Monture and Taiaiake Alfred. Turner claims that the problem with the decolonial strategies developed by these scholars is that they fail to propose a means of

effecting positive change within the very legal and political structures that currently hold a monopoly on the power to determine the scope and content of our rights. According to Turner, by focusing too heavily on tactics that would see us “turn our backs” on the institutions of colonial power, these Indigenous scholars do not provide the tools required to protect us against the unilateral construction of our rights by settler-state institutions. For Turner, it is through an ethics of participation that Indigenous peoples can better hope to “shape the legal and political relationship so that it respects Indigenous world views.”⁹⁹

The efficacy of Turner’s intervention rests on a crucial theoretical assumption reflected in his text’s quasi-Foucauldian use of the term *discourse*. I say quasi-*Foucauldian* because when he refers to the discursive practices of word warriors he assumes that these pack the “power” necessary to transform the legal and political discourses of the state into something more amenable to Indigenous languages of political thought. Here Turner assumes that the counterdiscourses that word warriors interject into the field of Canadian law and politics have the capacity to shape and govern the ways in which Aboriginal rights are reasoned about and acted on. The problem, however, is that Turner is less willing to attribute the same degree of power to the legal and political *discourses of the state*. This is what I mean when I claim that his use of the concept is *quasi-Foucauldian*. When Turner speaks of the legal and political discourses of the state, he spends little time discussing the assimilative power that these potentially hold in relation to the word warriors that are to engage them. Indeed, the only place he does briefly mention this is at the end of his final chapter, when he writes:

For an indigenous person the problem of assimilation is always close at hand. The anxiety generated by moving between intellectual cultures is real, and many indigenous intellectuals find it easier to become part of mainstream culture. This kind of assimilation will always exist, and it may not always be a bad thing for indigenous peoples as a whole. It becomes dangerous when indigenous intellectuals become subsumed or appropriated by the dominant culture yet continue to act as if they were word warriors.¹⁰⁰

Here we reach a limit in Turner’s argument: there is little discussion of how Indigenous peoples might curb the risks of *interpellation* as they seek to *interpolate* the much more powerful discursive economy of the Canadian legal and

political system. Although Turner repeatedly suggests that part of the answer to this problem lies in the ability of word warriors to remain grounded in the thought and practices of their communities, in the end he spends little time discussing what this might entail in practice.

Further, while Turner is right to pay attention to discursive forms of power, his analysis eclipses the role that *nondiscursive* configurations play in reproducing colonial relations. My concern here is that the problem with the legal and political discourses of the state is not only that they enjoy hegemonic status vis-à-vis Indigenous discourses, but that they are also backed by and hopelessly entwined with the economic, political, and military might of the state itself. This means that Indigenous peoples must be able to account for these material relations as well, which would require an exploration of theories and practices that move beyond liberal and ideational forms of discursive transformation. While I recognize that this might be beyond the scope of Turner's investigation, I think that speaking to the diversity of forms of decolonial practice would have made his case more convincing.

One of the important insights of Fanon's critique of the politics of recognition is that it provides us with theoretical tools that enable us to determine the relative transformability of certain fields of colonial power over others. These tools subsequently put us in a better position to critically assess which strategies hold the most promise, and which others are more susceptible to failure.

CONCLUSION

In retrospect, Fanon appears to have overstated the "cleansing" value he attributed to anticolonial violence.¹⁰¹ Indeed, one could argue that many Algerians have yet to fully recover from the legacy left from the eight years of carnage and brutality that constituted Algeria's war of independence with France. Nor was the Front de Libération Nationale's (FLN) revolutionary seizure of the Algerian state apparatus enough to stave off what Fanon would call "the curse of [national] independence": namely, the subjection of the newly "liberated" people and territories to the tyranny of the market and a postindependence class of bourgeois national elites.¹⁰² But if Fanon ultimately overstated violence's role as the "perfect mediation" through which the colonized come to liberate themselves from both the structural and psycho-affective features of colonial domination that he identified so masterfully, then what is the relevance of his work here and now?¹⁰³

In this chapter I have suggested that Fanon's insights into the subjectifying nature of colonial recognition are as applicable today to the liberal "politics of recognition" as they were when he first formulated his critique of Hegel's master/slave relation. I have also suggested that Fanon's dual-structured conception of colonial power still captures the subtle (and not so subtle) ways in which a system of settler-state domination that does not sustain itself exclusively by force is reproduced over time. As Taiaiake Alfred argues, under these "postmodern" imperial conditions "oppression has become increasingly invisible; [it is] no longer constituted in conventional terms of military occupation, onerous taxation burdens, blatant land thefts, etc.," but rather through a "fluid confluence of politics, economics, psychology and culture."¹⁰⁴ But if the dispersal and effects of colonial and state power are now so diffuse, how is one to transform or resist them? Here I believe that Fanon's work remains insightful. In that all important footnote in *Black Skin, White Masks* where Fanon claimed to show how the condition of the slave in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* differed from those in the colonies, he suggested that Hegel provided a partial answer: that those struggling against colonialism must "turn away" from the colonial state and society and instead find in their own *decolonial praxis* the source of their liberation. Today this process will and must continue to involve some form of critical individual and collective *self*-recognition on the part of Indigenous societies, not only in an instrumental sense like Fanon seemed to have envisioned it, but with the understanding that our cultural practices have much to offer regarding the establishment of relationships within and between peoples and the natural world built on principles of reciprocity and respectful coexistence. Also, the empowerment that is derived from this critically self-affirmative and self-transformative ethics of desubjectification must be cautiously directed *away* from the assimilative lure of the statist politics of recognition, and instead be fashioned toward our own on-the-ground struggles of freedom. As the feminist, antiracist theorist bell hooks explains, such a project would minimally require that we stop being so preoccupied with looking "to that Other for recognition"; instead we should be "recognizing ourselves and [then seeking to] make contact with all who would engage us in a constructive manner."¹⁰⁵ In my concluding chapter I flesh-out what such a politics might look like in the present; a politics that is less oriented around attaining a definitive form of affirmative recognition from the settler state and society, and more about critically reevaluating, reconstructing, and redeploying

Indigenous cultural forms in ways that seek to prefigure, alongside those with similar ethical commitments, radical alternatives to the structural and psycho-affective facets of colonial domination discussed above. However, before I can commence with this concluding part of my project, Fanon's critique of recognition must first be evaluated against the politics of recognition as it has played out in the empirical context of Indigenous–state relations in Canada. Providing such an evaluation will be my focus in the next three chapters.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. When deployed in the Canadian context, I use the terms “Indigenous,” “Aboriginal,” and “Native” interchangeably to refer to the descendants of those who traditionally occupied the territory now known as Canada before the arrival of European settlers and state powers. At a more general level I also use these terms in an international context to refer to the non-Western societies that have suffered under the weight of European colonialism. I use the specific terms “Indian” and “First Nation” to refer to those legally recognized as Indians under the Canadian federal government’s Indian Act of 1876 (unless indicated otherwise).

2. Dene Nation, “Dene Declaration,” in *Dene Nation: The Colony Within*, ed. Mel Watkins (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 3–4 (emphasis added).

3. Assembly of First Nations (AFN), *Our Nations, Our Governments: Choosing our Own Paths* (Ottawa: Assembly of First Nations, 2005), 18.

4. *Ibid.*, 18–19. The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) was established by the federal government in 1991 to investigate the social, cultural, political, and economic impact of the colonial relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the state in Canada. The commission culminated in a five-volume *Final Report*, which was published in 1996. The RCAP report will be examined in detail in chapter 4.

5. For discussion, see Michael Murphy, “Culture and the Courts: A New Direct in Canadian Aboriginal Rights Jurisprudence?,” *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 34, no. 1 (2001): 109–29; Murphy, “The Limits of Culture in the Politics of Self-Determination,” *Ethnicities* 1, no. 3 (2001): 367–88.

6. Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND), *The Government of Canada’s Approach to Implementation of the Inherent Right and the Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-Government* (Ottawa: Published by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1995).

7. Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity* (Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 2007); Sheryl Lightfoot, “Indigenous Rights in International Politics: The Case of ‘Overcompliant’ Liberal States,”

Alternatives: Global Local Political 33, no. 1 (2008): 83–104; Ronald Niezen, *The Origins of Indigenism: Human Rights and the Politics of Identity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); James (Sa'ke'j) Henderson, *Indigenous Diplomacy and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achieving UN Recognition* (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2008).

8. Alan Cairns makes the argument that recognition politics have required the state to reconceptualize the relationship with Indigenous peoples; see his *Citizens Plus: Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian State* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000); and *First Nations and the Canadian State: In Search of Coexistence* (Kingston, Ont.: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 2005). The language of “mutual recognition” is used explicitly in RCAP, *Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples*, 5 vols. (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1996); Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, *Gathering Strength: Canada's Aboriginal Action Plan* (Ottawa: Published under the authority of the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1997); *A First Nations–Federal Crown Political Accord on the Recognition and Implementation of First Nation Governments* (Ottawa: Published under the authority of the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 2005). For a more substantive, postcolonial articulation, see James Tully, *Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in the Age of Diversity* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

9. Richard J. F. Day, *Multiculturalism and the History of Canadian Diversity* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000). Also see Richard Day and Tonio Sadik, “The BC Land Question, Liberal Multiculturalism, and the Spectre of Aboriginal Nationhood,” *BC Studies* 134 (Summer 2002): 5–34. The following writings provide a sample of the more influential works in the diverse field of recognition-based approaches to liberal pluralism: Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in *Re-Examining the Politics of Recognition*, ed. Amy Gutmann, 27–73 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 1995); Kymlicka, *Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada* (Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 1998); Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship* (Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 2001); Kymlicka, *Multicultural Odyssey*; Tully, *Strange Multiplicity*; Patrick Macklem, *Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001); RCAP, *Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples*; Keith Banting, Thomas Courchene, and F. Leslie Seidle, eds., *The Art of the State*, vol. 3, *Belonging? Diversity, Recognition and Shared Citizenship in Canada* (Kingston, Ont.: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2007); Siobhán Harty and Michael Murphy, *In Defence of Multinational Citizenship* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005).

10. Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, *Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy* (Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1969). For an authoritative analysis of the philosophical underpinnings of the 1969 White Paper, see Dale Turner, *This Is Not a Peace Pipe: Towards a Critical Indigenous Philosophy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007).

11. For a history of this period, see John Tobias, "Protection, Assimilation, Civilization," in *Sweet Promises: A History of Indian-White Relations in Canada*, ed. J. R. Miller, 127–44 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991); RCAP, *Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples*, vol. 1.

12. J. R. Miller, *Shingwauk's Vision: A History of Indian Residential Schools* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996). This book provides an authoritative history of residential schools in Canada.

13. Sarah Carter, *Lost Harvests: Prairie Indian Reserve Farmers and Government Policy* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993); Helen Buckley, *From Wooden Ploughs to Welfare: Why Indian Policy Failed the Prairie Provinces* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992).

14. Bonita Lawrence, "Gender, Race and the Regulation of Native Identity in Canada and the United States," *Hypatia* 18, no. 2 (2003): 3–31; Lawrence, "Real" Indians and Others: Mixed-Blood Urban Native Peoples and Indigenous Nationhood (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005).

15. Christopher Walmsley, *Protecting Aboriginal Children* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005).

16. On settler-colonialism and the "logic of elimination," see Patrick Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native," *Journal of Genocide Studies* 8, no. 4 (2006): 387–409.

17. "Statement of the National Indian Brotherhood," in *Recent Statements by the Indians of Canada*, Anglican Church of Canada General Synod Action 1969, Bulletin 201, 1970, 28, quoted in Olive Patricia Dickason, *Canada's First Nations: A History of Founding Peoples from Earliest Times* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1992), 386.

18. Sally Weaver, cited in Leonard Rotman, *Parallel Paths: Fiduciary Doctrine and the Crown-Native Relationship in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 7.

19. Dickason, *Canada's First Nations*, 388.

20. *Calder et al. v. Attorney-General of British Columbia* (1973).

21. *St Catherine's Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen* (1888).

22. For an excellent discussion of the *Calder* case and its influence, see Michael Asch, "From 'Calder' to 'Van der Peet': Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Law, 1973–96," in *Indigenous Peoples' Rights in Australia, Canada and New Zealand*, ed. Paul Have-mann, 428–46 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

23. *Ibid.*, 430–32.

24. Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, *Statement on Claims of Indian and Inuit People: A Federal Native Claims Policy* (Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 1973.

25. Francis Abele, Katherine Graham, and Allan Maslove, "Negotiating Canada: Changes in Aboriginal Policy over the Last Thirty Years," in *How Ottawa Spends, 1999–2000*, ed. Leslie Pal (Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 2000), 259.

26. Jean Chrétien in *Montreal Gazette*, June 16, 1972, 1, quoted in Robert Davis and Mark Zanis, *The Genocide Machine in Canada* (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1973), 42.

27. Mel Watkins, ed., *Dene Nation: The Colony Within* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977); Thomas Berger, *Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland: The Report of The Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry* (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 1977). These texts summarize the struggle of the Métis and Dene during this period. On the efforts of the James Bay Cree, see Boyce Richardson, *Strangers Devour the Land* (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 1991).

28. Wolfe, "Settler-Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native," 388. Throughout the following chapters I will often use the terms "settler-colonialism," "colonialism," and (on occasion) "imperialism" interchangeably to avoid repetitiveness. I do so, however, acknowledging the distinction that Wolfe, Lorenzo Veracini (*Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* [London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010]), Robert Young (*Postcolonialism: A Historical Introduction* [Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2001]), and James Tully (*Public Philosophy in a New Key*, vol 1. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004]) have drawn between these interrelated concepts. In the work of all of these scholars, settler-colonial and colonial relationships are conceptualized as more *direct* forms or practices of maintaining an imperial system of dominance. Settler-colonialism, in particular, refers to contexts where the territorial infrastructure of the colonizing society is built on and overwhelms the formerly self-governing but now dispossessed Indigenous nations; indeed, settler-colonial polities are predicated on maintaining this dispossession. Imperialism is a much broader concept, which may include colonial and settler-colonial formations, but could also be carried out indirectly through noncolonial means.

29. Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol 1. (New York: Penguin, 1990).

30. *Ibid.*, 874.

31. Ward Churchill, ed., *Marxism and Native Americans* (Boston: South End Press, 1983). The character of the debate is well represented in this text.

32. Charles Menzies, "Indigenous Nations and Marxism: Notes on an Ambivalent Relationship," *New Proposals: Journal of Marxism and Interdisciplinary Inquiry* 3, no. 3 (2010): 5.

33. Peter Kropotkin, *Conquest of Bread and Other Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 221.

34. Jim Glassman, "Primitive Accumulation, Accumulation by Dispossession, Accumulation by 'Extra-Economic' Means," *Progress in Human Geography* 30, no. 5 (2005): 611.

35. Marx, *Capital*, 1:899. The degree to which Marx is susceptible to this general line of criticism is itself the subject of debate. For instance, an interesting argument developed by Massimo De Angelis suggests that if we conceive of primitive accumulation as a set of strategies that seeks to permanently maintain a *separation* of workers from the means of production then it would follow that this process must be ongoing insofar as this separation is constitutive of the capital relation as such. The specific character of primitive accumulation strategies might change at any given historical juncture, but as a general process of ongoing separation it must remain in effect indefinitely. See Massimo De Angelis, "Marx and Primitive Accumulation: The Continuous

Character of Capital's 'Enclosures,'" *The Commoner*, no. 2 (September 2001): 1–22. However, the question this position raises is why then utilize the historical marker "primitive" to refer to the process at all, instead of simply referencing the "accumulation of capital" proper? This latter question is explored in Paul Zarembka, "Primitive Accumulation in Marxism, Historical or Trans-Historical Separation from Means of Production?," *The Commoner* (March 2002), 1–9, as a qualification to Angelis's earlier contribution to the same journal.

36. David Harvey, *The New Imperialism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Silvia Federici, *Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body, and Primitive Accumulation* (New York: Autonomedia, 2004); Taiaiake Alfred, *Wasáse: Indigenous Pathways of Actions and Freedom* (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2005); Rauna Kuokkanen, "Globalization as Racialized, Sexual Violence: The Case of Indigenous Women," *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 10, no. 2 (2008): 216–33; Andrea Smith, *Conquest: Sexual Violence and American Indian Genocide* (Boston: South End Press, 2005). Also see Retort Collective, *Afflicted Powers: Capital and Spectacle in a New Age of War* (New York: Verso, 2005); Michael Pearlman, *The Invention of Capitalism: Classical Political Economy and the Secret History of Primitive Accumulation* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000); Todd Gordon, "Canada, Empire, and Indigenous Peoples in the Americas," *Socialist Studies* 2, no. 1 (2006): 47–75; Robin Blackburn, *The Making of New World Slavery* (London: Verso, 1997). Also see De Angelis, "Marx and Primitive Accumulation"; De Angelis's article is one of many contributions in the issue devoted to examining the continual relevance of Marx's dispossession thesis in the contemporary period.

37. Robert Nichols, "Indigeneity and the Settler Contract Today," *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 39, no. 2 (2013): 166.

38. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Commonwealth* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009), 84.

39. Karl Marx, "The British Rule in India," in Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, *On Colonialism* (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2001), 41–42. This is also the underlying thrust of Marx and Engels's famous assertion in *The Communist Manifesto*: "The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word it creates the world after its own image" (*Karl Marx: Selected Writings*, ed. David McClelland [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987], 225). For a useful discussion of this aspect of Marx's argument, see Aijaz Ahmad, *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures* (New York: Verso, 1994); Epifanio San Juan Jr., *Beyond Postcolonial Theory* (New York: Saint Martin's Press, 1999); Arif Dirlik, *The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998); Crystal

Bartolovich and Neil Lazarus, eds., *Marxism, Modernity, and Postcolonial Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

40. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Philosophy of History* (New York: Dover, 1956), 99; Karl Marx, "The Future Results of the British Rule in India," in *On Colonialism*, by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2001), 81.

41. This rigidly unilinear understanding of historical development began to shift significantly in Marx's work after the collapse of the European labor movement following the defeat of the Paris Commune in 1871. It was at this point that Marx began to again turn his attention to the study of non-Western societies. Marx scholars have tended to identify three areas of Marx's late writings (1872–83) that reflect this shift in perspective: (1) editorial changes introduced by Marx to the 1872–75 French edition of *Capital*, vol. 1, that strip the primitive accumulation thesis of any prior suggestion of unilinearism; (2) a cluster of late writings on Russia that identify the Russian communal village as a potential launching point for socialist development; and (3) the extensive (but largely ignored) ethnological notebooks produced by Marx between 1879 and 1882. See, in particular, Kevin Anderson, "Marx's Late Writings on Non-Western and Pre-Capitalist Societies and Gender," *Rethinking Marxism* 14, no. 4 (2002): 84–96; and Gareth Stedman Jones, "Radicalism and the Extra-European World: The Case of Karl Marx," in *Victorian Visions of Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth-Century Political Thought*, ed. Duncan Bell, 186–214 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Although each of these three strands in Marx's late scholarship are instructive in their own right, his 1872–75 French revisions to *Capital* are of particular interest for us here because of the specific focus paid to the primitive accumulation thesis. Marx referred to these revisions in a well-known 1877 letter he wrote to Russian radical N. K. Mikailovsky, in which he states that the "chapter on primitive accumulation" *should not* be read as a "historico-philosophical theory of the general course imposed on all peoples"; but rather as a historical examination of the "path by which, in *Western Europe*, the capitalist economic order emerged from the womb of the feudal economic order" (Karl Marx, "A Letter to N. K. Mikailovsky," transcribed and reprinted in *The New Internationalist* 1, no. 4 [November 1934]: 1). Marx makes the virtually analogous point in his well-known letter to Russian populist Vera Zasulich (Karl Marx, "A Letter to Vera Zasulich," in McClelland, *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*, 576–80).

42. Marx, *Capital*, 1:932.

43. *Ibid.*, 1:940. For a discussion of this feature of Marx's project, see R. Young, *Postcolonialism*, 101–3.

44. Marx, *Capital*, 1:932.

45. As David McNally succinctly puts it: at its "heart" primitive accumulation is ultimately about "the commodification of human labour power" (*Another World Is Possible: Globalization and Anti-Capitalism* [Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring Press, 2006], 107).

46. Federici, *Caliban and the Witch*, 12.

47. For an example of this line of argument drawn from the neoliberal right, see Thomas Flanagan, *First Nations, Second Thoughts* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000). For an example claiming to speak from the left, see Frances Widdowson and Albert Howard, *Disrobing the Aboriginal Industry: The Deception behind Indigenous Cultural Preservation* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008).

48. Aidan Foster-Carter, "The Modes of Production Controversy," *New Left Review* 107 (1978): 47–77. This text provides an excellent introduction to the "articulation of modes of production" debate.

49. For an autonomous Marxist critique of socialist primitive accumulation that also draws off the insights of Kropotkin, see Harry Cleaver, "Kropotkin, Self-Valorization, and the Crisis of Marxism," *Anarchist Studies* 2, no. 2 (2003): 119–36.

50. Frances Abele and Daiva Stasiulis, "Canada as a 'White Settler Colony': What about Natives and Immigrants," in *The New Canadian Political Economy*, ed. Wallace Clement and Glen Williams (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1989), 252–53. Also see Terry Wotherspoon and Vic Satzewich, *First Nations: Race, Class, and Gender Relations* (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 2000); David Bedford and Danielle Irving, *The Tragedy of Progress: Marxism, Modernity and the Aboriginal Question* (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2001). On the importance of Native labor to Canadian political economic development, see John Lutz, *Makuk: A New History of Aboriginal-White Relations* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2008).

51. Cole Harris, "How Did Colonialism Dispossess? Comments from an Edge of Empire," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 94, no. 1 (2004): 167.

52. Canada, "Annual Report Department of Indian Affairs," *Sessional Papers*, 1890, no. 12, 165.

53. Taiaiake Alfred articulates this point well in the context of Canada's land claims and self-government policies when he writes: "The framework of current reformist or reconciling negotiations are about handing us the scraps of history: self-government and jurisdictional authorities for state-created Indian governments within the larger colonial system and subjection of Onkwehonwe [Indigenous peoples] to the blunt force of capitalism by integrating them as wage slaves into the mainstream resource-exploitation economy" (*Wasáse*, 37).

54. Marx, *Capital*, 1:876.

55. Joel Kovel, *The Enemy of Nature: The End of Capitalism of the End of the World?* (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2007); John Bellamy Foster, *Marx's Ecology: Materialism and Nature* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000). These authors provide a constructive conversation regarding both the limits and potential of Marx's ecological insights.

56. On intersectionality as a methodological approach to studying questions of race, class, gender and state power, I am indebted to a number of critical works, including the following: Rita Dhamoon, *Identity/Difference Politics: How Difference Is Produced, and Why It Matters* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009); Yasmin Jiwani, *Discourses of Denial: Mediations of Race, Gender and Violence*

(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2006); Smith, *Conquest*; Chandra Talpade Mohanty, *Feminism without Borders* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003); Razak Sherene, *Looking White People in the Eye: Gender, Race and Culture in Courtrooms and Classrooms* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998).

57. Marx, *Capital*, 1:874.

58. *Ibid.*, 1:926.

59. In framing this question, I do not intend to suggest that the day-to-day effects of colonial dispossession within our communities have not been incredibly violent in character. All evidence points to the contrary. Nor am I suggesting that the era of overtly coercive colonial rule has come to an end. The frequency of what have at times been spectacular displays of state power deployed against relatively small numbers of Indigenous community activists has shown this not to be the case either. The violent state interventions that transpired at Kanesatake in 1990 and Gustafsen Lake in 1995 demonstrate this all too well. I am merely suggesting that strategically deployed state violence no longer constitutes the *first response* in maintaining settler-colonial hegemony vis-à-vis Indigenous nations. On the military and paramilitary attacks at Kanesatake and Gustafsen Lake, see Geoffrey York and Loreen Pindera, *People of the Pines: The Warriors and the Legacy of Oka* (Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1991); and Sandra Lambertus, *Wartime Images, Peacetime Wounds: The Media and the Gustafsen Lake Standoff* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).

60. See in particular, Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Charles Lam Markmann (1967; repr., Boston: Grove Press, 1991); Fanon, *A Dying Colonialism* (Boston: Grove Press, 1965); Fanon, *Toward the African Revolution* (Boston: Grove Press, 1967); Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (Boston: Grove Press, 2005). For a theory of colonial governmentality that draws more centrally from Michel Foucault's contributions, see David Scott, "Colonial Governmentality," *Social Text* 43 (Autumn 1995): 191–220. Also see, Michel Foucault, "Governmentality" and "The Subject of Power," in *Power: The Essential Works of Michel Foucault*, vol. 3, ed. James Faubian (New York: The New Press, 1994), 201–22, 326–48.

61. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 4.

62. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).

63. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (1991), 45.

64. Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 32–33.

65. James Clifford, "Taking Identity Politics Seriously: The Contradictory Stony Ground . . .," in *Without Guarantees: Essays in Honour of Stuart Hall*, ed. Paul Gilroy, Lawrence Grossberg, and Angela McRobbie, 94–112 (London: Verso, 2000).

66. Brian Barry, *Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 325.

67. Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking Recognition: Overcoming Displacement and Reification in Cultural Politics," in *Recognition Struggles and Social Movements: Identities, Agency and Power*, ed. Barbara Hobson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 22.

68. I would argue that this claim applies to other identity-related struggles as well. As James Tully suggests, when “struggles over recognition” are conceived of in “broad” or “ontological” terms, it is clear that any effort to alter “the norms under which citizens are led to recognize themselves [and each other] will have effects in the distribution or redistribution of the relations of power among them.” This is as true in cases where workers collectively struggle to challenge the prevailing norms of exploitative nonrecognition that have hitherto excluded them from participating in the democratic governance of a site of production, as it is in contexts where a group of Indigenous women challenge a patriarchal norm of misrecognition which has functioned to exclude, assimilate, or dominate them. When seen in this light, many, if not most, of today’s prominent social movements clearly “exhibit both recognition and distribution aspects” (*Public Philosophy in a New Key* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008], 1:293–300).

69. Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political Philosophical Exchange* (New York: Verso, 2003), 72–78.

70. Cressida Heyes, *Line Drawings: Defining Women through Feminist Practice* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 35.

71. Anne Philips, *Multiculturalism without Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 14.

72. Richard J. F. Day, *Gramsci Is Dead: Anarchist Currents in the Newest Social Movements* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Pluto Press, 2005), 15.

1. THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION IN COLONIAL CONTEXTS

1. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*.

2. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (1991), 148.

3. R. Young, *Postcolonialism*, 275.

4. Fraser and Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition?*, 1.

5. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 11–119.

6. See in particular, Alexander Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit* (New York: Basic Books, 1969). Also see Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1956); Sartre, *Anti-Semite and Jew: An Exploration of the Etiology of Hate* (New York: Schocken Books, 1974); Sartre, “Black Orpheus,” in *Race*, ed. Robert Bernasconi, 115–42 (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2001). The relationship between Fanon and Sartre on the question of recognition will be taken up in more detail in chapter 5.

7. Nigel Gibson, “Dialectical Impasses: Turning the Table on Hegel and the Black,” *Parallax* 8, no. 2 (2002): 31.

8. Fraser and Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition?* 11.

9. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 178.

10. Robert Pippin, “What Is the Question for Which Hegel’s Theory of Recognition Is the Answer?,” *European Journal of Philosophy* 8, no. 2 (2000): 156.

11. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 191–92.

12. *Ibid.*, 191, 192.

13. *Ibid.*, 195.

14. Robert Williams, "Hegel and Nietzsche: Recognition and Master/Slave," *Philosophy Today* 45, no. 5 (2001): 16.

15. Patchen Markell, *Bound by Recognition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 25–32. One could argue that this is not necessarily the case with respect to Hegel's later works, particularly *The Philosophy of Right* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), where the state is understood to play a key role in mediating relations of recognition.

16. Markell, *Bound by Recognition*, 25.

17. Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 61, 40.

18. *Ibid.*, 61.

19. *Ibid.*, 32–34; and Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), 27.

20. Charles Taylor, *The Malaise of Modernity* (Toronto: Anansi Press, 1991), 45–46.

21. Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 25

22. *Ibid.*, 26, 36.

23. *Ibid.*, 36, 64.

24. *Ibid.*, 26.

25. *Ibid.*, 40; also see Charles Taylor, *Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), 148, 180.

26. Taylor, *Reconciling the Solitudes*, 180. Also see Charles Taylor, "On the Draft Nisga'a Treaty," *BC Studies* 120 (Winter 1998/1999): 37–40.

27. Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 40.

28. Richard Day and Tonio Sadik, "The BC Land Question, Liberal Multiculturalism, and the Spectre of Aboriginal Nationhood," *BC Studies* 134 (2002): 6. Taylor, *Reconciling the Solitudes*, 148. Taylor, "Politics of Recognition," 41.

29. Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 65–66.

30. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (1991), 12; Taylor, "Politics of Recognition," 65–66. Also see Charles Taylor, *Philosophical Papers*, vol. 2, *Philosophy and the Human Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 235.

31. A number of studies have mapped the similarities and differences between the dialectic of recognition as conceived by Fanon and Hegel, but relatively few have applied Fanon's insights to critique the groundswell appropriation of Hegel's theory of recognition to address contemporary questions surrounding the recognition of cultural diversity. Even fewer have used Fanon's writings to problematize the utility of a politics of recognition for restructuring hierarchical relations among disparate identities in colonial contexts. For a survey of the available literature, see Irene Gendzier, *Fanon: A Critical Study* (New York: Grove Press, 1974); Hussien Bulhan, *Frantz Fanon and the Psychology of Oppression* (New York: Plenum Press, 1985); Lou Turner, "On the Difference between the Hegelian and Fanonian Dialectic of Lordship and Bondage," in *Fanon: A Critical Reader*, ed. Lewis Gordon, Denean Sharpley-Whiting, and Renee White, 134–51 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996); Beatrice Hanssen, "Ethics of the Other," in *A Turn to Ethics*, ed. Marjorie Garber, Beatrice Hanssen, and Rebecca Walkowitz, 127–80 (New York: Routledge, 2000); Sonia Kruks, *Retrieving Experience:*

Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); Kelly Oliver, *Witnessing: Beyond Recognition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001); Nigel Gibson, "Dialectical Impasse: Turning the Table on Hegel and the Black," *Parallax* 23 (2002): 30–45; Gibson, *Fanon: The Postcolonial Imagination* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003); Anita Chari, "Exceeding Recognition," *Sartre Studies International* 10, no. 2 (2004): 110–22; Andrew Schaap, "Political Reconciliation through a Struggle for Recognition?," *Social and Legal Studies* 13, no. 4 (2004): 523–40.

32. Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," in *Mapping Ideology*, ed. Slavoj Žižek (London: Verso, 1994), 100–140.

33. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (1991), 84 (emphasis added).

34. Fanon's contemporary Albert Memmi drew a similar conclusion five years later, in 1957: "Constantly confronted with this image of himself, set forth and imposed on all institutions and in every human contact, how could the colonized help reacting to this portrait? It cannot leave him indifferent and remain a veneer which, like an insult, blows with the wind. He ends up recognizing it as one would a detested nickname which has become a familiar description. . . . Wilfully created and spread by the colonizer, this mythical and degrading portrait ends up being accepted and lived to a certain extent by the colonized. It thus acquires a certain amount of reality and contributes to the true portrait of the colonized" (*The Colonizer and the Colonized* [Boston: Beacon Press, 1991], 87–88 [emphasis added]).

35. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (1991), 111–12.

36. *Ibid.*, 109.

37. *Ibid.*, 111.

38. *Ibid.*, 112.

39. *Ibid.*, 109.

40. Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 26.

41. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (1991), 11–12.

42. *Ibid.*

43. *Ibid.*, 11.

44. *Ibid.*, 202.

45. *Ibid.*, 11.

46. Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 5.

47. Georg Lukacs, *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 83.

48. For example, see Himani Bannerji, *Dark Side of the Nation* (Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press, 2001); Richard Rorty, *Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998); Rorty, "Is 'Cultural Recognition' a Useful Notion for Leftist Politics?," *Critical Horizons* 1, no. 1 (2000): 7–20; Richard Day, "Who Is This We That Gives the Gift? Native American Political Theory and *The Western Tradition*," *Critical Horizons* 2, no. 2 (2001): 173–201; Day and Sadik, "The BC Land Question," 5–34; Brian Barry, *Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism* (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002); Fraser and Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition?*

49. Fraser and Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition?*, 12–13.

50. Day, “Who Is This We That Gives the Gift?,” 189.

51. In particular, see Howard Adams, *Prison of Grass: Canada from a Native Point of View* (Saskatoon: Fifth House Publishers, 1975); Adams, *A Tortured People: The Politics of Colonization* (Penticton, Ont.: Theytus Books, 1999). Also see Marie Smallface Marule, “Traditional Indian Government: Of the People, By the People and For the People,” in *Pathways to Self-Determination: Canadian Indians and the Canadian State*, ed. Menno Boldt, J. Anthony Long, and Leroy Little Bear, 36–53 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984); Watkins, *Dene Nation*.

52. For example, see: Lee Maracle, *I Am Woman: A Native Perspective on Sociology and Feminism* (Vancouver: Press Gang Publishers, 1988); Taiaiake Alfred, *Peace Power Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto* (Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 1999); Alfred, *Wasáse*; Smith, *Conquest*; Gord Hill, “Indigenous Anti-Colonialism,” *Upping the Anti* 5 (2007), 4–15.

53. Alfred, *Peace Power Righteousness*, 60.

54. Alfred, *Wasáse*, 133.

55. A more thorough treatment of Indigenous anticapitalism in Canada will be examined in chapters 2 and my concluding chapter.

56. Fraser and Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition?*, 29.

57. Day, “Who Is This We That Gives the Gift?,” 176. Also see Nancy Fraser, “Against Anarchism,” *Public Seminar Blog*, October 9, 2013, <http://www.publicseminar.org/2013/10/against-anarchism/#.UzR7nTKcXok>.

58. Fraser and Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition?*, 100.

59. *Ibid.*, 31.

60. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (1991), 11.

61. For a comprehensive evaluation of Fraser’s critique of “psychologization” in the work of Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth, see Simon Thompson, *The Political Theory of Recognition* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 31–41.

62. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (1991), 217 (emphasis added).

63. *Ibid.*

64. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 113–14.

65. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (1991), 220 (emphasis added).

66. *Ibid.*, 18.

67. *Ibid.*, 12.

68. Turner, “On the Difference,” 146.

69. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (1991), 221.

70. Oliver, *Witnessing*.

71. Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 9.

72. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (1991), 220–22.

73. Taylor, “Politics of Recognition,” 50 (emphasis added).

74. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (1991), 220 (emphasis added).

75. Will Kymlicka frames the problem of colonialism as a matter of unjust incorporation into dominant state structures; see his *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 1995); *Finding*

Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada (Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 1998); *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship* (Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 2001).

76. Todd Gordon, "Canada, Empire and Indigenous Peoples in the Americas," *Socialist Studies* 2, no. 1 (2006): 47–75.

77. Isabelle Schulte-Tenckhoff, "Reassessing the Paradigm of Domestication: The Problematic of Indigenous Treaties," *Review of Constitutional Studies* 4, no. 2 (1998): 239–89.

78. Michael Asch, "From 'Calder' to 'Van der Peet': Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Law," in *Indigenous Peoples' Rights in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand*, ed. Paul Have-
mann, 428–46 (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1999); Patrick Macklem, *Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001); James Tully, "The Struggles of Indigenous Peoples for and of Freedom," in *Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*, ed. Duncan Ivison, Paul Patton, and Will Saunders, 36–59 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

79. Supreme Court of Canada, *Delgamuukw v. British Columbia* (1997), 3 SCR 1010, in *Delgamuukw: The Supreme Court of Canada Decision on Aboriginal Title* (Vancouver: David Suzuki Foundation, 1998), 35, quoted in James Tully, "Aboriginal Peoples: Negotiating Reconciliation," in *Canadian Politics*, ed. James Bickerton and Alain-G. Gagnon, 3rd ed. (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2000), 413.

80. Elizabeth Povinelli, *The Cunning of Recognition: Indigenous Alterities and the Making of Australian Multiculturalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002).

81. Eduardo Duran and Bonnie Duran, *Native American Postcolonial Psychology* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995).

82. Alfred, *Wasáse*.

83. Bill Ashcroft, *Post-Colonial Transformations* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 35.

84. Ashcroft, *Post-Colonial Transformations*; David Scott, *Refashioning Futures: Criticism after Postcoloniality* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Scott, *Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).

85. I think Taylor's own account of recognition demands an answer to this question also. For instance, in relying on Hegel's master/slave dialectic to make his point about the constitutive relation between recognition and freedom, Taylor seems to downplay the fact that the agency and self-understanding fought for and won by the slave occurs in a condition marked by inequality and misrecognition, not reciprocity. As Nikolas Kompridis points out, here the slave is "able, at least partially, to resolve the 'epistemological crisis' set in motion by his unsatisfied . . . desire for recognition without receiving the kinds of recognition [theorist's such as Taylor regard] as necessary and sufficient conditions of successful agency and personal identity." This same point can be made with respect to the background political context animating Taylor's essay: namely, since confederation the respective relationships of Quebec and Indigenous peoples to the Canadian state have been marked by domination, yet both Quebec and Indigenous peoples routinely resist this dominance through creative displays of political agency and collective empowerment; the Quiet Revolution and Red Power

movements provide two particularly salient examples of this. In light of this, the question that needs to be asked again is where are these manifestations of collective empowerment coming from if not from recognition provided by the Canadian state? See Nikolas Kompridis, "Struggling over the Meaning of Recognition: A Matter of Identity, Justice or Freedom?," *European Journal of Political Theory* 6 (2007): 283.

86. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (1991), 222.

87. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 148.

88. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (1991), 221.

89. Kruks, *Retrieving Experience*, 101. Fanon's position on the emancipatory potential of negritude will be explored further in chapter 5.

90. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (1991), 222.

91. R. Young, *Postcolonialism*, 275. For an authoritative treatment of the historical successes and failures of the Third World's postcolonial political projects, see Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World* (New York: The New Press, 2007).

92. Jorge Larrain, "Stuart Hall and the Marxist Concept of Ideology," in *Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies*, ed. David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen (New York: Routledge, 1996), 48; John Scott, *Power* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 10. Also see Stuart Hall, "The Problem of Ideology: Marxism without Guarantees," in *Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies*, ed. David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen, 25–46 (New York: Routledge, 1996).

93. Larrain makes a similar point but without reference to Fanon in "Stuart Hall and the Marxist Concept of Ideology," 49.

94. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (1991), 183.

95. Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 8.

96. R. Young, *Postcolonialism*, 295.

97. Dale Turner, *This Is Not a Peace Pipe: Towards a Critical Indigenous Philosophy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 5.

98. *Ibid.*, 31.

99. *Ibid.*, 111.

100. *Ibid.*, 114.

101. Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 51.

102. *Ibid.*, 54.

103. *Ibid.*, 44.

104. Alfred, *Wasáse*, 58, 30.

105. bell hooks, *Yearning: Race, Gender and Cultural Politics* (Boston: South End Press, 1990), 22.

2. FOR THE LAND

1. Lois McNay, *Against Recognition* (London: Polity, 2008), 3.

2. Frances Widdowson and Albert Howard, *Disrobing the Aboriginal Industry: The Deception behind Indigenous Cultural Preservation* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 2007), 264.