

The G7 Leaders' 2025 Statement on AI for Prosperity: Do the Commitments and Actions Align?

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Executive Summary

Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies have become a strategic imperative for nation-states, with governments worldwide—particularly those within the Group of Seven (G7)—prioritizing the adoption and deployment of AI systems across key areas of the public sector. G7 countries have expressed an interest in implementing AI to improve public service delivery, strengthen government efficiency, and reduce costs. However, an analysis of publicly available information concerning the use of AI applications across G7 governments reveals: (1) limited transparency about AI tool developers and vendors, which hinders the ability to assess the alignment between governments' stated intent and the true impact of these technologies; (2) a disproportionate concentration of AI applications in security and military domains, which elevates the risk of states' engaging in surveillance-oriented tactics; and (3) insufficient evidence that governments are prioritizing the deployment of AI in public service areas such as education, environment, housing, and healthcare as promised.

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for their annual summit where they discussed a variety of global issues, including international trade, climate change, and AI.¹ Among these, AI emerged as a critical topic of mutual priority. In the "G7 Leaders' Statement on AI for Prosperity," countries outlined their shared approach to integrating and expanding AI use into the public sectors of their respective nations (Group of Seven, 2025). Their stated objectives centered on advancing innovation and investment in AI, while simultaneously acknowledging the essential role of human contributions and emphasizing the need for responsible uses of AI. The G7 commitments included a pledge to "[w]ork together to accelerate

adoption of AI in the public sector to enhance the quality of public services for both citizens and businesses" (Group of Seven, 2025). At this meeting, host country Canada announced the "G7 GovAI Grand Challenge" as well as "Rapid Solution Labs" to "develop innovative and scalable solutions to the barriers" to the adoption of "AI in the public sector" (Group of Seven, 2025).

In line with these goals, almost all the G7 countries have enacted legislation or issued policies mandating the

Introduction

On June 17, 2025, leaders from the G7 countries gathered


¹ The G7 countries include the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, Japan, France, Italy, and Germany. Although the European Union (EU) is considered a non-enumerated member of the G7, its commitments are expressed in this research as a collection of intentions from France, Italy, and Germany as individual countries; there were no AI applications from the EU as an entity included in this study.

use of AI for government services. The UK, Italy, and Japan have all passed laws regarding both public sector and private sector AI use. The UK’s Algorithmic Transparency Recording Standard, Italy’s Bill No. 1146, and Japan’s Act on Promotion of Research and Development and Utilization of Artificial Intelligence Related Technologies were all enacted in 2025 (Algorithmic Transparency Recording Standard, 2025; Italy’s Bill No. 1146, 2025; Japan’s Act on Promotion of Research and Development and Utilization of Artificial Intelligence Related Technologies, 2025). In addition, the EU’s AI Act was implemented in 2024 (AI Act, 2024), which impacts France, Italy, and Germany. Some of the G7 countries have yet to pass formal AI legislation but have implemented national strategies and proposed bills, such as Canada’s Artificial Intelligence and Data Act introduced

survey the websites of AI companies with G7 government partnerships as well as relevant news coverage.

All data were compiled into a spreadsheet and coded by country, name of the AI application, relevant government domain (e.g., criminal justice, healthcare) and type of AI technology (e.g., facial recognition, predictive analytics). Data accessibility varied across countries, with legislative mandates generally more readily available than information about specific software application deployments. Language barriers were minimal or works were directly translated by the author. For German-language sources, digital translation tools were used to convert content from German to English.

The data consists of 57 AI applications used within various government sectors among the G7 countries (please



in 2022, and the UK’s AI Regulation Bill proposed in 2023 (Artificial Intelligence and Data Act, 2022; AI Regulation Bill, 2022). France and the US have opted to establish non-binding national strategies for navigating AI, introduced in 2017, 2023, and 2025 (France 2030, 2017; AI Bill of Rights, 2023; America’s AI Action Plan, 2025).

Publicly available information about AI-related legislation and policies in the G7 offers insight into countries’ stated priorities and actual practices. Drawing from this data, this policy brief examines how AI is being deployed across the G7 and evaluates whether the goals of each country’s AI applications align with their legislation and stated intentions for use.

Methods

This study examined AI-related strategies, policies, and legislation across G7 countries using official government websites. After initial review, additional research was conducted to identify specific AI applications used for government services. The research then expanded to

refer to the Appendix for the full list of applications). Some of the domains in use include Defense, Education, Food and Agriculture, Health, Public Safety, Revenue and Customs, Science and Technology, Transportation, and Environment. The AI uses included facial recognition technology, visual analysis, document processing, prediction technology, and large language models (LLMs). Figure 1 represents a simplified version of the domains within which AI is deployed in each country.

Among the G7 countries, the most publicly reported domain for AI applications was Homeland Security, while Education had the least. A significant portion of AI applications were used by the US government which accounted for 48% of the 57 documented use cases. Finally, the most commonly used AI technologies were LLMs and visual analysis.

Findings

Initial findings suggest that G7 countries’ stated intentions for AI use do not align with what they have actually

prioritized within their countries. Discrepancies in transparency and the deprioritization of non-military and non-security applications raises concerns about the G7's credibility regarding their commitments towards AI tools for public service.

Lack of Transparency

A main gap identified by the research pertained to each nation's disclosure (or lack thereof) of their use of AI applications. Some countries, such as France, have reported the names of the specific platforms they have deployed (e.g. Nabla Healthcare) whereas others, such as the US, have noted that they are using AI for a certain goal, but did not disclose the name of the system or service (e.g. intelligent document processing used in Homeland Security). The US, UK, and France disclosed the most AI applications on government websites whereas Germany, Italy, and Canada had the fewest. Furthermore, there were instances in which the name of an AI company partnering with governments was disclosed, such as Aleph Alpha based in Germany, but the application's purposes were concealed, other than the fact that it is a generative AI platform used in their military (Cherney, 2024). These omissions can explain why the majority of the AI uses in Figure 1 have been from the US. It is important to note that without full disclosure of AI applications, there is no guarantee that the G7's objective to implement AI for public services has been fulfilled. Nevertheless, the lack of consistency in the disclosure of AI applications goes against G7 leaders' goals to improve their delivery and communication of AI to the public.

Although the US has the most reported cases of AI application use, that does not necessarily mean that the US uses the most AI for government services, as Canada, Germany, and Italy have not yet published AI registries. A potential reason for the lack of disclosure regarding certain AI applications is that public organizations often partner with private AI vendors which are technically not obligated to share intellectual property. In their research of emerging technologies, for example, scholar Merve Hickock (2024) states that "less reporting and transparency requirements and less respect for purpose limitations means individuals or public have no insight as to who is using which data for what purposes" (p. 1219). Regardless of country, the absence of federal legislation mandating private AI vendors to publish AI applications and related datasets makes

it difficult to discern the types of AI tools and systems being deployed for government services, contradicting the G7's claims in their original statement to "promote transparency" within AI use (Group of Seven, 2025).

Prioritization of Military and Security Uses

Across the G7, governments reported AI applications spanned a range of sectors. Of the 57 identified AI applications, approximately two thirds were concentrated in Public Safety, Defense, and the military. This concentration likely reflects the rise of the use of AI applications for predictive analytics, which offers strategic advantages in areas such as threat detection and defense planning.

It is important to note that not all AI systems and services used in security and military domains serve security and military purposes directly; for example, the US Department of Homeland Security uses AI for administrative tasks such as summarizing documents. Nevertheless, the emphasis on security and military domains raises concerns about the long-term implications of these AI applications. The concentration of AI deployment towards military and security purposes suggests G7 governments' investment towards advancing these domains. It is possible that the G7's collective prioritization of AI used to bolster national security risks reinforcing a surveillance-centric trajectory, at the expense of the possible public service benefits in domains such as education and healthcare. The focus towards military and security is a departure from the G7's declaration to prioritize public services in their integration of AI.

Deprioritization of AI for Public Service

The G7 leaders have publicly announced to their constituencies that AI has the potential to improve many aspects of daily life. In their joint press release from the 2025 annual summit, they envisioned AI as a tool "to grow prosperity, benefit society, and address pressing global challenges" and "enhance the quality of public services for both citizens and businesses" (Group of Seven, 2025). However, the G7's prioritization of AI towards Public Safety and Defense domains raises important concerns about the citizens and communities most impacted by government-deployed AI tools and systems.

While investment in technologies that can maintain a safe and secure country are important, the data reveals

that reported AI applications were unevenly distributed across government sectors. Non-military and non-security domains were represented, but with far fewer applications—averaging only three per sector—compared to the significantly higher use cases in military and security domains. The lack of AI applications for public services raises concerns because it goes against the interests of the population.

Public opinion also suggests a missed opportunity. A study of attitudes towards AI in government services discovered that “AI [programming] is significantly more accepted than human [contributions] in the provision of general public services,” particularly in education, healthcare, social services, and infrastructure (Geske & Leyer, 2022, p.6). Therefore, citizens are more likely to support AI applications catered to the needs of public quality of life and wellbeing.

In their promotion of AI, G7 leaders should be careful not to neglect their experimentation of AI-powered solutions for pressing public issues like climate change, healthcare access, and educational disparities. Disregarding these areas risks alienating citizens and undermining the G7’s own stated commitment to invest in AI uses that enhance public services and “benefit societies” (Group of Seven, 2025).

Conclusion

With the emergence of AI, the G7 has communicated its goal to integrate AI use into public services. However, the lack of disclosure of public sector AI applications, especially in domains such as healthcare, education, and the environment, creates a disconnect between G7 governments and citizens. In addition, AI innovation with a narrow scope on military and security uses further diminishes citizens’ needs. To build trust and uphold the G7’s stated principles, countries should invest in public registries and expand the responsible use of AI in public services.

This report provides only a snapshot of currently available AI applications for government use. Future research should examine the development of these AI applications to identify which companies are leading the market in AI for government services. While the German and Japanese governments have disclosed partnering with

private start-up companies, additional research is needed to determine whether the rest of the G7 is following suit. Due to the narrow scope of AI-related strategies, policies, and legislation reviewed in this memo, additional insight can be gleaned from further research in peer-reviewed

literature and from more domestic and international proclamations and reports, such as the US Government Accountability Office AI report (GAO, 2023). Some studies have also identified AI

applications within fields such as policy making and space administration (Van Noordt & Misuraca, 2022). Overall, continued transparency from G7 leaders and broadening research to include more public sectors will help us understand the implications of AI adoption in G7 countries, as citizens across these countries are relying on leaders to keep the commitments of public service and responsibility.

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Appendix

G7 AI for Prosperity Use Cases: <https://albert.ias.edu/20.500.12111/9978>

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